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Abstract 
Ghana has recently joined the league of oil and gas producing states in commercial quantities. 
There are demands to make sure this resource transforms the economy in a positive manner to 
benefit all and sundry but not a few. Such desire has led to the call to consider the acclaimed 
rich oil experience of Norway. This has induced the involvement of Norway in the 
development of the new Ghanaian petroleum industry.  
This thesis delves into how valuable the Norwegian oil experience can be for Ghana in an 
attempt to make the oil and gas find a blessing but not a curse. The Norwegian petroleum 
experience is rich and offers several universal valuable lessons. However such lessons ought 
to be contextualized due to the dynamics of the settings and times. 
It was found that development of an oil industry like the Norwegian experience does not only 
rest on the few technocrats but several actors and conditions come into play to shape the role 
of petroleum in the development of a state. Factors like the radical concession regime prior to 
the oil discovery, strong labour movements, democracy, accountability, transparency etc have 
all played diverse roles in shaping of the Norwegian petroleum experience. However premium 
is normally put on only transparency, accountability, democracy and institutions (technocrats) 
to showcase to the outside world as the key instruments to help avert the negative effects of 
oil production in large quantities. 
Again, it was realized that petroleum exploitation involves several actors interest. But the 
society of Norway was determined to secure control over its resources which occasionally led 
to conflicts between them and the oil companies. This was actualized due to the incorporation 
of the labour unions into the political spheres of Norway. And this indicated that democracy is 
not only characterized by peaceful presidential and parliamentary elections but also with 
active and direct popular mobilization to demand transparency and accountability, because 
politicians will only be good as you want them to be.  
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Chapter One 
Introduction 
 
1.0 Background 
Norway has recently become involved in establishing the Ghanaian oil and gas industry. It is 
claimed its rich experience can be put to use in Ghana and assist the country avoid the 
“resource curse”. In this thesis I ask whether this is really the case. Is the Norwegian 
petroleum experience of value to Ghana?  
The resource curse has been explained by Auty (1993, 2001); Collier and Hoeffler (1998, 
2002a); Ross, (1999, 2001) and, Sachs and Warner (2001) as how natural resource rich 
countries are unable to take advantage of this wealth to enhance their economies. More often 
than not, these countries can be classified as having poor economic growth compared to their 
counterparts without such natural resource abundance. The supposed advantages of 
economies in terms of having access to natural resources are frequently strangled by all sorts 
of conflicts, corruption, lack of transparency, weak institutions and more often the majority of 
their citizens are isolated in abject poverty. It is against this background that Norway has 
apparently achieved a status which is highly revered in the field of petroleum management.  
Larsen (2004) and Ryggvik (2010) demonstrate how important and influential the Norwegian 
petroleum industry has become in changing the economic fortunes of the average Norwegian 
in a positive direction. Norway was ranked as the best place to live in the world by the United 
Nations 2010 Human Development Index. It should also be recognized that Norway was the 
poorest among the Scandinavian countries prior to the discovery and subsequent exploitation 
of oil in 1971 (Larsen, 2004).  
Ghana, a young (two decades of uninterrupted democratic rule) state, has recently discovered 
petroleum and begun the exploitation in commercial quantities. With this development the 
expectations of Ghanaians have been heightened. However there is some level of caution 
since Ghana has a history of exploiting other natural resources like gold, diamond, bauxite, 
timber, cocoa etc and still struggles to reduce the poverty levels of majority of the people. 
Recognizing this history, this thesis intends to take a critical look at the Norwegian petroleum 
experience and consider how beneficial it is to other countries that are unable to benefit from 
their petroleum resource to serve as a lesson for Ghana. A detailed examination will be made 
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of what actions has Norway taken to have avoided the resource curse. Norway is one of the 
few exceptions including Botswana, Bolivia, Chile, Canada, Indonesia etc that have had 
relative success with respect to petroleum resource management.       
The conclusion of this research I hope can be used to provide lessons and knowledge that can 
be used by a new entrant state like Ghana in the production of petroleum. It is recognized that 
the certainty of the success of a replicated policy cannot always be assured due to the 
dynamics and particularity of each geopolitical setting. Contextualized recommendations will 
be made to suite the Ghanaian situation at the end of the research. This critical examination of 
the Norwegian oil experience will be analyzed through the lens of theories of international 
political ecology, socio-cultural, domestic political and economic dynamics. In this respect 
attempts will also be made to consider the best possible areas to invest oil revenue to 
encourage social development in Ghana. Again, emphasis will be placed on political, 
educational and environmental issues as the key thematic areas in which the analysis will be 
done.  
The production of petroleum involves the interplay of both national and international (states 
and non states actors alike) interests which must be carefully balanced to bring out the 
positive effects to the producing states. Many of the cases previously studied revealed that it 
is quite difficult to raise the required capital for exploration and exploitation domestically. 
Indeed, foreign companies with private and commercial interests engaged commonly use foul 
means to protect and guarantee their interests. This apparently makes it difficult for those 
(republics) which have the right to these resources to fully benefit from them.   
 The key questions posed by this project are;   
 What does the Norwegian petroleum experience consist of? 
 Does the lack of policy space in the global political economy play a role in the 
resource curse conundrum?  
 What impact do globalisation and liberalisation of the world’s economy have on the 
performance of extractive economies? (i.e. Can Ghana in 2012 act like Norway in 
1971?)  
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1.1 Theoretical framework  
There have been several attempts to theorize the myth behind the resource curse. The thesis of 
greed and grievances is one of such theories which argues that countries endowed with natural 
resource abundance have their development impeded by devastating conflicts, corruption and 
poverty. One common explanation is that this occurs because rebels are easily funded by rents 
from natural resources; (Collier and Hoffler 2001a). Thus, when particular group of people 
with common identity feel cheated or neglected by the elites, they tend to demand for their 
portion of the rent from the resources (as result grievances). Small groups of people (the 
elites) plan to weaken the state institutions in order to gain control over the resources so that it 
can benefit them and their cohorts because of economic opportunism or greediness. 
Dependency theory also points to the fact that economies that have a higher percentage rate of 
their gross domestic product (GDP) as rent from natural resources, find it difficult to perform 
well. This is because the international commodity market prices for these products are very 
unstable (Ross, 1999). This tends to deny the state of a regular and reliable source of income. 
Also the overreliance of the economy on the resource sector at the expense of the non 
resource sector frequently results in Dutch Disease – a situation where the resource sector of 
the economy causes appreciation of the real exchange rate and consequently crowds out the 
other tradable sectors especially manufacturing sectors by making them non-competitive 
(Corden and Neary 1982; Bruno and Sachs 1982). 
The above mentioned theories attempt to explain the connection between resource abundance 
and poor economic growth. However, the effects of the political environment (the global 
political economic architecture) in which the producer and buyer states operate is frequently 
ignored. What takes place in the global politico-economic architecture is a sort of 
“clientelistic” (master-servant relationship), where the producing states have little or no 
control over the sales of their resources. The ideological struggle in the international political 
system, between super powers is gradually paving way for the struggle for economic might, 
which forms the basis of military might. The ability to gain economic might is premised on a 
reliable source of energy which also depends on the accumulation of (wealth) natural 
resources (especially oil and gas) of the weaker states. This has motivated what might be 
called “Trojan horse” policies by the super powers (USA, France, Britain and recently China 
etc) in the global south. The Washington based institutions (IMF and World Bank) propagate 
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policies which simply betrays the basic responsibilities of the state; thus making the necessary 
regulative environment for the citizenry to fully benefit from what naturally belongs to them 
almost impossible. Reinert (2008) reveals how rich countries have developed through 
government intervention, protectionism and strategic investment. But these same super 
powers through the IMF and World Bank insist on unqualified and absolute standards of free 
trade as the only means to advance economically. This has continuously rendered the poor 
countries poorer since they do not compete with the technologically advanced (rich) states on 
fair grounds. Again, this quest of the imperial powers to economically secure themselves, has 
led to the disregard of the sovereignty of the weaker states. This undermines such countries’ 
ability to manage their own affairs in the context of their peculiar socio-cultural and economic 
needs and aspirations (Omeje, 2008 and McNeish & Logan et at, 2012).            
The neorealist thesis could help to identify how best interests (internal and external) could be 
managed as well as toning down the possibility of creating serious class difference, as a result 
of wealth that will be generated out of the production oil and gas in Ghana. The neo realist 
theory of Kenneth Waltz helps to explain why states must act in their interest in the face of 
international liberalization and globalization (Waltz, 1979). Neo realism is a school of thought 
founded on the principle that, the international political system is anarchical. The anarchy in 
this sense means there is no central authority in the international system to enforce order, 
therefore states must act in their own interest above all others or risk lagging behind. 
Therefore what can apparently assist the resource producing states to succeed is to protect 
what is in their national interest against all odds when dealing with the external parties 
involved in this petroleum business. This can be done by utilising the expertise of professional 
negotiators in their negotiations with the Trans national petroleum companies to achieve the 
best for their nations. Most petroleum producing states often lack the prerequisite knowledge 
about the giving out of concessions and that conforms to Adam Smith’s assertion in his 
Wealth of Nations (Reich, 2000:166) that due to ignorance and liberality, landlords usually do 
not get the real/highest value of their land. This is why nations ought to have people with the 
expertise to handle the negotiations of the contracts and giving out concessions. However, 
carrots and stick forms of negotiations can be employed when dealing with the foreign oil 
companies in spite of the pressure from trade liberalisation and globalisation. Thus, tool of 
reprisal can be used by the government to take a firm stance on its national interest.       
This reveals the problem of securing national interest in a better perspective as multinational 
companies or transnational cooperation (TNCs) are deeply involved in both exploration and 
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exploitation of petroleum resources. It also suggest how best Ghana can protect and promote 
her interest whilst operating in the framework of globalization. Globalisation as a 
phenomenon comes with some level of restrictions to the nation state. Due to ratifications and 
agreements (bilateral or multilateral) the sovereignty (authority) of states are occasionally 
limited especially when it comes to employing protectionist measures in favour of one’s own 
interest.    
1.2 Research methodology 
According to Merriam (2002) qualitative research establishes that, meanings are socially 
constructed in several ways and are interpreted as such in reality while it changes with time. It 
is in this light that qualitative method helps to seek to understand the interpretation of realities 
of the Norwegian oil industry to suit the Ghanaian context. Bryman (2012) argues, qualitative 
as a research strategy is broadly inductivist, constructionist, and interpretivist but its users do 
not always subscribe to all these three features. This study focuses on the understanding and 
opinions (i.e. constructed) and interpretations of interviewees about Norwegian petroleum 
experience through a purposive sampling. Based on this, I use my subjective interpretation in 
the analysis of the collected data (including articles, journals, books etc). That is the analysis 
of the data collected includes semi structure interview of respondents and other secondary 
sources.   
A comparative analysis between Ghana and Norway has been utilized to critically asses how 
beneficial a model from one setting can be effective in a different geopolitical setting with its 
own peculiar needs. Thus, I find out about the kind of lessons the Norwegian petroleum sector 
offers to the Ghanaian oil industry. An intensive examination has been carried out to find out 
about how petroleum has brought about economic growth in Norway in an egalitarian 
manner. In so doing, the young and still developing Ghanaian petroleum experience has been 
observed through the lens of the Norwegian experience in the following thematic areas; 
Political, environmental and educational perspectives. I propose that this will help to identify 
the exact causes of the Norwegian petroleum management success as well as the weaknesses 
which may serve as a guiding principle for Ghana in this particular respect. 
1.3 Data collection and Interview guide 
In-depth and semi-structured interview have been carried out with concerned officials in 
relevant institutions in the framework of purposive sampling. Purposive sampling is where 
respondent are sampled in a strategic manner, so that those sampled are relevant to the 
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research questions posed (Bryman, 2012). Interviews carried out have been supplemented by 
analysis and empirical information drawn from various relevant sources such as books, 
articles, journals, references, observations and internet articles in a thematic manner. These 
secondary sources have been obtained from institutions and ministries in Norway. Examples 
of some of these bodies are; Norwegian Agency for Development Cooperation (NORAD), 
Petroleum Management Knowledge Transfer (PETRAD), Norwegian Petroleum Directorate 
(NPD), Statoil, Norwegian Petroleum Museum. Since it is to some extent difficult to isolate 
particular reasons for the acclaimed Norwegian success based on individual’s perspective, 
interviewees have been allowed to present their subjective account. This has enabled me to 
acquire diversified account of what the apparent success story of Norwegian oil experience 
consist of. Thus what are the Dos and the Don’ts one can learn from the Norwegian oil 
experience?    
1.4 Structure of the Study 
The thesis is organised into seven chapters. The first chapter is the overall introduction of the 
study. It discusses the background, research methodology, the theoretical framework, data 
collection and interview guide of the study. Chapter two provides a review of the relevant 
literature. Chapter three highlights the political and economic orientation of Ghanaian in the 
perspective of the new petroleum industry. A critical look at the Norwegian experiences in the 
hydrocarbon sector is the main objectives of chapter four. Chapter five looks at the 
Norwegian experience in Ghana with particular emphasis on the Oil for Development 
Programme. The penultimate chapter also discusses and compares the literature with the 
findings and the final chapter works on the conclusions and proposals of the study.  
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Chapter Two 
Literature Review 
 
2.1 The Resource Curse 
The resource curse thesis explains how natural resource rich states struggle to cope with the 
pace of economic development relative to their counterparts, who do not have the benefits of 
these important and strategic resources. Though natural resources ought to serve as a catalyst 
for economic growth, there is still the tendency for them to cause poor economic growth 
(McNeish & Logan et al 2012 and Davis 1995). However, the majority of the states which 
enjoy such bounty of nature show a great sign of evidence in support of the resource curse. 
Countries like Nigeria, Angola, Sudan, Equatorial Guinea, Sierra Leone, DRC etc are 
examples of countries commonly experiencing the effects of the resource curse. They 
demonstrate poor economic growth despite huge natural resource endowment. This is because 
of their inability to utilize the importance of their natural resources.  
The resource curse thesis is however, a selective explanation of the causes of the difficulties 
experienced by countries in the south. It fails to consider relevant factors such as geopolitics, 
cultural and historical dynamics etc which have great influence on the resource curse thesis 
(Davis, 1995, Omeje, 2008 & 2004 and McNeish & Logan et al 2012). A critical examination 
of the validity of this assertion (the resource curse) is the primary objective of this chapter. In 
this chapter I try to explore and highlight the weaknesses underlying the resource curse 
discourse. 
 Comparatively, the Asian Tigers (South Korea, Hong Kong, Singapore and Taiwan) for 
example, are less endowed with natural resources but have achieved significant success in 
economic development. Thus these states have achieved high economic growth rate, 
unprecedented poverty reduction and wealth creation in the face of little or no dependence on 
natural resources. This came to provoke a corpus of researchers to scrutinize the resource 
curse thesis further. There is a confluence of consensus within the scholarship of the resource 
curse debate (Auty, 1993, 2001); Collier and Hoeffler (1998, 2002a); Ross, (1999, 2001) and, 
Sachs and Warner (2001) that resource abundance and economic growth are antithetically 
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related. As a result of this there is the widely accepted notion of paradox of scarcity in the 
midst of abundance with respect to countries endowed with natural resources but with a 
exception of a few. Moreover, it has been difficult for states especially those in the southern 
hemisphere to quench their desire to achieving qualitatively better societies with the rent from 
these strategically important natural resources.  
Auty (1993) postulates the term “resource curse” to explain the inverse correlation between 
natural resource and economic growth. This situation has attracted a diversity of intellectual 
discourse in examining the connection between these two puzzling phenomena. He highlights 
that states with higher percentage of GDP from natural resource experience worse economic 
performance as compared to those that are less dependent on such resources. This is attributed 
to the instability of the commodity prices in the international commodity market. Collier and 
Heoffler (1998 and 2002a) suggest that oil dependant economies or states are at a higher risk 
of degenerating into civil conflict than those which are less dependent on these resources. 
What Collier and Hoeffler (1998 and 2002a) try to bring to fore in their work on the 
“Economic causes of civil war” and “Greed and grievances” respectively, is the relation 
between resource and the conditions that unleash civil conflict. States with higher percentage 
share of their GDP from the contributions of primary resources or commodity are highly 
vulnerable to civil war. This is because rebels easily find the opportunity to be financed which 
fosters rebellion. 
 Le Billon (2004) also indicates that natural resources came as a substitute to foreign 
sponsorship due to its subsequent withdrawal at the later part of the cold war in the late 1980s. 
Not only does it serve as a main source of income to states, it also serves as a strong 
motivation for conflicts and war in both domestic and international affairs. Several scholars 
have linked a significant number of intra and inter-state wars to resources, and especially to 
oil and gas. Some analysts classify the Iraqi and the recent Libya invasions by US and NATO 
respectively as oil wars. Depending on the nature of the resource in question (how close or far 
the resource is) rebels are motivated to gain control in the form of rent-seizing, as Ross (2001) 
puts it. Again, how easily a resource can be accessed or looted determines the kind of 
influence it has on or serves as a source of conflict. The easy access to loot the resource 
increases the probability of it causing conflict (Ross, 2001 and Le Billon 2004).    
Ross (2001) further explores the resource curse to affirm how poor states especially those in 
the global south are endowed with natural resources. He tries to attribute the vulnerability of 
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the extractive (oil and mineral wealth) economies to civil wars to their endowment with 
natural resources. This is because such states are less democratic. The non existence of 
democracy is caused by these same resources. This tends to result in oligarchic governance. 
That is where few people take control of the state and government apparatus and make it work 
in their favour.  He further notes that states which produce resources, and especially oil, are 
often characterized by authoritarianism. Lack of democracy is explained as a major cause of 
resource conflicts which is a common phenomenon among the resource producing countries.  
Theorists have explained that political elites who gain control over the natural resources 
(especially oil and gas) of a state work to keep the states undemocratic in order to have the 
chance to line their pockets with rents from the resources.  “… Oil and mineral wealth tend to 
make states less democratic”. This is because leaders do not account for their stewardship due 
to little or no taxes from the citizenry. Ross (1999) explains the kind of relationship that exists 
between resource abundance and economic growth. This is attributed to the decline in terms 
of trade for primary commodities, the instability of prices in the international commodity 
market, the poor linkages between resource and non resource sectors, and an ailment of Dutch 
disease. 
He further lays out the political aspects of the causes of the resource curse. Ross has 
categorized the explanation as having three parts. These are; a cognitive explanation, which 
attributes the curse to the lack of proper vision on the part of policy makers of states endowed 
with natural resources. That is, the political elites of these states do not foresee the potential 
negative effects as a result of the resource boom. Societal explanation is also used to elaborate 
that rents from the exports of these resources empowers sections of the society to impede 
growth policies in order to maintain their leverage over the booty that comes out of the 
resources. The last part of this section of Ross (1999) is to some extent dependent on D. 
Michael Shafer and Terry Lynn Karl argument that resource abundance adversely affects state 
institutions especially when the boom comes at the genesis of state formation. The third and 
last section of Ross (1999) addresses the issue of resource curse by identifying state owned 
enterprises in charge of exploitation or extraction of the resource as a major cause of conflict 
in extractive economies. And secondly, the lack of willingness to ensure property rights due 
to the weak institutions is also classified as direct or indirect cause of conflict. 
Another influential theory to have gained dominance in the resource curse thesis is the 
behaviourist. Scholars inclined to this theory are of the view that the economic windfall from 
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natural resources tend to induce political elites to be complacent with respect to prudent 
economic measures. Irrational and emotional attitude of the political elites lead to poor 
economic policymaking due to myopia, sloth, over exuberance as a result of the windfall 
(Rosser, 2006 and Ross, 1999). Contrary to this, some political actors also act rationally in 
conformity to the self utility maximisation concept. Thus resource abundance brings about the 
opportunity for political actors to enrich themselves with the rent from the natural resources at 
the expense of the ordinary citizens. As a result of this, the issue of both greed and grievances 
come into play when the issue of resource curse is being addressed by scholars. Collier and 
Hoeffler (2004) confirms this by arguing that there is a greater incentive for rebellion when 
there is the recognition of the opportunity for rebels to enrich themselves through their ability 
to control a particular kind of natural resources in form of rent seeking.      
 
2.2.0 Problematising the Resource Curse Thesis  
Though the resource curse thesis has gain dominance among wide range of scholars, there 
have been counter arguments by Davis (1995), Omeje (2004, 2005 and 2008), Rosser (2006), 
and McNeish & Logan et al (2012) that there are equally important factors which the resource 
curse thesis does not bring into play. Omeje (2004) argues that lack of consideration of 
historical dynamics results in a poor understanding of the linkage between resource 
abundance and poor economic growth. Thus some key factors (like the effects of the global 
political and economic architecture) are often neglected during the study of the infamous 
resource curse. A critical review of case studies done previously by scholars is employed by 
Davis (1995) to establish the lack of proper evidence in support of the resource curse enigma. 
He disagrees with the synonymous use of Dutch disease and resource curse with the 
explanation that they are never the same. He further attributes the causes of the resource curse 
to something more political than the resource itself.  
To some degree, there are evidences to link resource abundance to poor economic 
performance but they are still quite weak to categorically establish this fact. There is the need 
to comprehensively interrogate the causal relationship between these two phenomena. There 
are unidentified contributing factors whether consciously or otherwise, as remote causes of 
poor economic performance whilst resource abundance may just be serving as proximate 
cause. Clarke (2008) highlights how imperial power like France’s actions in West and Central 
Africa contribute to crises in these regions. This happens as result of the role they play in their 
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political - petroleum world game in the African domain. Auty (2001a) indicates, resource 
dependant economies performed extremely well prior to the 1960s. Can the global economic 
and political dynamics with respect to the Washington based institutions’ (International 
Monetary Fund and World Bank) structural adjustment programs be a source of worry in 
reference of the resource curse? It has reasonably been argued that natural resources have the 
potential and do contribute to the resource curse by prolonging or aggravating resource 
conflicts. Omeje (2008:93) agrees to some degree with Collier’s argument that greed might be 
the cause of some of the resource conflicts. However, he strongly disagrees with him that 
limiting the causes of resource conflicts ultimately to greed and economic opportunism is a 
sufficient account of the underlying factors (like deep-rooted grievances and structural 
inequalities; often legacies of colonisation) that give a better understanding of the linkage 
between resource and conflict. 
2.2.1 Geopolitics and the Resource Curse 
The resource curse debate decouples the role of geopolitical factors in resource economies 
and governance from the causes of underdevelopment. Thus the debate does not incorporate 
the impact of the international political system on the resource curse in the so called weak 
states. Kaldor et al (2007) argues that recent geopolitical competition together with violent 
predatory behaviour of non-states foreign and domestic actors contribute to the resource curse 
through their means of getting access to oil rent, be it fair or foul. This also tends to adversely 
affect the weaker force in the competition. Rent seeking attitudes of states and non-state 
actors in resource governance ought to be a major concern for any attempt to establish a clear 
understanding of why there is scarcity in the midst of abundance. Most of the conflicts 
prevailing in most extractive economies can hardly be disassociated from imperialism, and 
this dates back to the colonial, post colonial and even (post-) cold war era. Moreover, Omeje 
(2005) highlights the impact of the IMF and World Bank’s Structural Adjustment Program on 
the conflicts in the West African sub region.  
“Contemporary forces of globalisation and imperial supervision and governance that define 
the international environment in which postcolonial states operate have in diverse ways 
contributed to the political and economic malaise of these less privileged states” Omeje 
(2005: 14). 
Perkins (2004) also reveals how powerful imperial powers interfere and manipulate the 
economies of weak states in order to gain control and consequently quench their resource 
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thirst. Powerful foreign entities (states and non state) actors classify certain resources as of 
important strategic interest in which they employ every means possible to access (Omeje 
2008). On the other hand, the role of the efforts geared towards the creation of global political 
and economic empire(s) by super powers is shockingly ignored in the resource curse debate. 
The Angolan resource conflict is good example to explain the role imperialism plays in the 
resource curse. The interest of the two great powers during the cold war motivated the 
formulation of liberation movements along distinct and competing ideologies in the 
international political ecology in the ambit of domestic ethnic divisions (Malaquias 2001). 
These movements were sponsored and supported by imperial powers with strategic interest in 
Angola.  
Again, since exploitation of natural resources especially oil and gas requires huge investment 
of capital and high level of expertise that the possessing states often lack. Foreign investors 
easily manipulate the situation. This consequently gives way for the larger chunk of the profit 
made out of those resources to be sent or invested outside of the producing economies by the 
foreign oil companies. With this, the situation of the already weak economies are further 
exacerbated and incapacitated to create jobs, and especially for youth. The result is increasing 
poverty and frustrations and later on grievances, all part of a recipe for resource conflict. This 
brings in the complexity of grievances and greed which requires urgent attention of scholars 
in addressing the resource curse conundrum (McNeish & Logan et al 2012). Thus geopolitical 
and economic dynamics coupled with historical factors are important factors in explaining the 
connection between the natural resource and economic development. Hudson (2005) and 
McNeish & Logan et al (2012) further elaborate the destructive impact the global financial 
system has on the productive sectors. Thus the activities of the IMF and the World Bank 
further worsen the economic plight of the developing countries by indebting them to an 
unbearable degree in order to get significant influence and consequently dictate to them. This 
is elaborated exhaustively in Moyo (2009) that by the end of the 1980s the cost of servicing 
loans to Africa (in the form of aid) grew to the extent that it eventually surpassed the inflow 
of aid to Africa. Both bilateral and multilateral aid agreement between governments to 
governments and institutions to governments respectively from the late 1980s to 1990s were 
heavily intensified. Thus the indebtedness of African states increased hugely. It even went to 
the extent that richer countries gave aid monies to the most corrupt regimes without any 
hesitation due to their attempt to canvass support during the cold war.   
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Furthermore, ideological struggles may not be as obvious in recent times as they used to be, 
but are still subtly alive. This has given the stronger states the impetus to usurp the booty 
(resources) of the weaker ones. That is such countries try all means possible to secure all 
forms of essential nonlocal supplies in order gain economic strength to push forward their 
ideological agendum. The recent activities (resource and land grabbing) of China in Africa 
and other parts of the world make it abundantly clear how desperate they are in their quest to 
balance the power (which they have already achieved, though arguable) and subsequently 
surpass that of the United States in the international political system. Political realists have 
argued that the international system is anarchical; no central authority to ensure order. 
Therefore states rely on self-help to secure themselves. In pursuit of national security and 
interest, states make every effort to gain a reliable source and a constant supply of as many 
resources as possible. This is what determines their economic and military might and it forms 
the basis for their relations to others. Consequently, this directly or indirectly forms basis of 
foreign policy of most states especially that of the super powers. This apparently motivated 
the establishment of the Bretton Woods institutions to prescribe policies based on economic 
norms in the context of the western ideologies to the states in the south which further add up 
to the impediments in the way of their economic progress.  
2.2.2 Globalisation and the Resource curse 
Globalisation is the process of interaction and integration among people, companies, agencies 
and governments of different nations commonly premised on trade and investment. 
Globalisation creates the opportunity for cultural interactions and offers benefits associated 
with economic integration and free trade. In spite of it not being recent phenomenon, it has 
gained more significance off late due to the advancement of information technology, 
civilisation among others. However globalisation still has its adverse effects on the economic 
development of the less privileged states.  
Observation proves that economics has been the primary catalyst for the institutionalisation of 
these interactions. That is to create a larger market for the production of goods and services. 
This is also in line with David Ricardo’s theory (Ricardo, 1817) of comparative advantage. 
That is some countries are more efficient in the production of particular goods and services 
than others. Therefore countries ought to produce the kind of goods and services they have 
comparative advantage of and trade (or barter) them with other countries. This together with 
other reasons contributed to the formation of international institutions like IMF and World 
Bank to facilitate trade by breaking down international trade barriers. 
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With these the sovereignty of the less privilege states is further weakened and undermined in 
terms of exercising economic control within their jurisdictions. This has subsequently 
rendered and continues to render these developing economies more vulnerable and exposed to 
the unfair competition from the advanced and industrialised countries. Consequently most of 
the states endowed with natural resources only serve as producers of raw materials to the 
industrial world. The local industries of these countries are unable to survive the 
incomparable competitive power of those from the industrial world. States with weak 
industrial (manufacturing) capacity is unable to create jobs for their people especially the 
youth. And this has the potential to create social tension and consequently resource conflict if 
the country in question is endowed with natural resource. This is why free trade is sometimes 
observed as making people poorer and yet western governments are firmly in support of it and 
giving out more aid as an incentive for accepting it (Reinert, 2008). However these incentives 
come with conditions which often create no policy space for the recipient countries.            
2.2.3 The Lack of Policy Space and the Resource Curse 
Policy space is the freedom to make effective choice among alternatives without any external 
influence in decision or policy making process. McNeish & Logan et al (2012) agrees with 
Stevens and Dietsche (2008) that, donor institutions prescribe policies based not on scientific 
knowledge but rather ideological perspectives. Norms and values (usually western) take 
precedence over the realities of life in the less privilege states in need of assistance. Thus 
policies of state and resource governance are fashioned out of normative or prescriptive 
political and economic principles of how states ought to look like and how they ought to be 
run (McNeish & Logan et al, 2012). As a result of this, most of the states endowed with 
natural resources which are usually weak are not given the free hand to operate in their 
relations with the other states in finding solutions to their domestic socio-economic and 
political problems. Solutions to their domestic problems are often imposed on them by 
external actors with little or no idea of the background of the problems in question.  
“...the loss of policy space induced by unequal power relations between donors driven by a 
common ideological agenda and Sub Saharan African governments constrained internally 
and externally to depend on aid flows. In other words, much aid from Western donors does 
not only come with high transaction costs and sometimes significant tying. It also comes with 
a strong ideological agenda, which may vary across donors in terms of emphasis, but that can 
ultimately shape policy decisions and processes”. (Oya, 2006).   
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Lack of policy space in the weaker states exhibits how the resource curse thesis neglects the 
differences in the processes of state formation in a historical and cultural context. In this sense 
policies are formulated in the circles of cultural universalism with strong western-centric 
ideological backing. Thus specifics of cultural relativism are scarcely incorporated in the 
dictates of policies handed out by super power nations to the less strong ones especially those 
in the global south.  The structural adjustment Program is a test case of how most states in the 
southern hemisphere were dictated to in the vacuum of socio-economic, political and cultural 
dynamics.  
The past two decades have been a particularly turbulent period in the political and economic 
history of West Africa and indeed the larger continent because of the devastating impact of 
the World Bank/IMF Structural Adjustment Programmes (SAP) on the resources and 
capacities of most states to meet developmental challenges and obligations to their citizen(...) 
(...) most war-affected and conflict-prone countries of Africa have been sorely affected by 
SAP accelerated decline in economic performance (high inflation, volatile or collapsed 
exchange rate regime, overwhelming external debt burden and debt servicing obligation, 
regressive international trade and foreign investment profile, etc) and human development 
requirements (public health care, safe water and sanitation, housing; land access for rural 
people, agricultural production and food quality, education, human capital investments and 
job creation. Omeje (2004 pp9) 
 
2.3 Conclusion    
The above explanation manifests how weak and exclusive the resource curse thesis has been 
with respect to countries in the south of the globe. There is a strong indication that the 
possession of natural resource cannot be attributed as the cause of poor economic 
performance of a state.  Whilst there might be a strong tendency towards the linkage between 
resources and conflict, contextual evidence demonstrates that this is far from a rule. That poor 
economic growth and conflicts that characterise the states endowed with natural resource 
cannot be solely attributed to their possession of natural resource. It is in connection with 
other factors such as the imposition of boundaries which were basically based on exploitative 
commercial and resource interest by colonial powers have had impact on such states. This has 
a great deal of effect on the economic performance and origin of conflicts in these states, 
because the lines of divisions did not consider the interests (frequently conflicting) of the 
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already existing ethnic groups. All of these come together to exacerbate the economic plight 
of the states endowed with natural resource.  In spite of the negligence of the other causes of 
the resource curse, there are new approaches to the resource curse debate which is broadening 
the horizon of these causes. Theories such as rentier space model, territorialisation; 
nationalisation and indigenisation are trying to bring a new dimension to resource curse 
debate.  
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Chapter Three 
The Norwegian Petroleum Experience 
3.0 Presentation of Data 
Petroleum resource has indisputably changed the economic fortunes of Norway for the better. 
Norway is recognized as one of the wealthiest nations in world in terms of GDP per capita 
and capital stock. As a welfare state it offers free education from the basic to the tertiary level 
to everyone (both nationals and non-nationals). In addition, a compulsory national pension 
plan offers to its citizens benefits like universal child support, one year paid maternity leave, 
pensions for widow, widower, disability, old age, rehabilitation and a special attention to the 
financial and medical needs of the people. These are cited as some of the reasons why 
Norway is classified as the best place to live on earth according to the human development 
index of UNDP (2011). This is a manifestation of how rent from natural resources can be 
utilized to benefit the entire society.  
In spite of the success story about the Norwegian economy, the oil industry started as in the 
present day developing countries with no technological know-how to exploit its own 
resources. However there were very useful conditions that already existed to have 
significantly influenced the petroleum activities in a positive direction and these will be 
discussed below. This chapter takes a flashback on how Norway was, prior to the oil and gas 
discovery in 1969 and marries it with events after the discovery. Since this study is not 
immune from the usual practical restrictions of research over a broad field of historical and 
social experience, the focus will be in the context of educational, environmental and political 
issues which converge to give a better explanation and understanding of how far Norwegian 
petroleum experience has come. 
3.1 Norway Prior to the Petroleum Production 
More often than not, Norway is seen as one of the few success stories of resource 
management in the pool of resource producing states. To get a better understanding of this 
success story, there is the need to take a critical look at how Norway was like before the 
petroleum exploitation. This highlights the situation that preceded the oil and gas exploitation 
in order to understand how such conditions have contributed to the petroleum experience and 
the extent of economic transformation that has occurred due to oil and gas production. It 
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should also be noted that Norway in the present day is battling with socio-economic problems 
such as the growing gap between the rich and the poor, surging up of queues for social 
assistance, drug addition, suicides, racism etc.  
By the 19th century the Norwegian economy performed relatively well due to its diversified 
nature. Maritime expertise, fishing, wood and timber, farming, domestic and international 
trade were the main stay of the economy. After independence from Denmark in 1814, Norway 
was above the European average income per capita by 1870. Apparently this was due to the 
opportunity offered to it by the royal union between them and Sweden at that time.  However, 
it initially (i.e. a few decades after independence) struggled with protectionism from the 
United Kingdom and international economic recession due to the Napoleonic wars. The 
economic situation was unstable until 1842 that Norway begun to see significant economic 
growth by the mid 1870s (Grytten 2010). This success was due to high productivity in 
agricultural (diversification from arable to livestock production), served as a major port 
(Bergen) for both domestic and international trade (exportation of fish and timber), significant 
boom in the Norwegian maritime services and liberalization of the economy. Norway rose to 
become a great power in shipping services and their sailing vessels freighted goods all over 
around the world. This accounted for about seven percent of the world merchant fleet in 1875 
(Grytten, 2010). Moreover, other sectors like the textile and mechanized industry of the 
economy also expanded. This economic boom brought about a close partnership between 
Norway and, Britain, Sweden, Denmark and Germany as her major trade partners. 
A few years later, the economic boom was replaced by economic stagnation and depression. 
Norway depended on the international economy especially the United Kingdom which was 
then experiencing economic slowdown. As a result, there was a contraction of exports which 
hugely affected the Norwegian economy. The exodus of Norwegians to the North Americas in 
the 1880s also contributed to the economic slowdown. Migration to some extent depreciated 
the labour force of the country and it had negative consequences on productivity. Furthermore 
the introduction of intentional gold standard adversely affected the Norwegian economy 
because of its scarcity and consequent high cost at that time. Subsequent adoption of gold 
standard by Norway in 1874 inflated the Norwegian currency (kroner) making gold expensive 
relative to silver. In effect there was a contraction of gold reserves and money stocks which 
further strangled the Norwegian economy. 
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When Norway became fully independent from Sweden in 1905, the industrial sector of the 
economy expanded significantly. The establishment of the Norsk Hydro in 1905 was a major 
cause of the expansion of the manufacturing - industrial sector because it served as a source of 
hydroelectric power to the industries. This was a great boost for economic take-off between 
1905 and 1920.  
Again there was another severe economic recession after the First World War (1914) and 
Norway was affected. However, at the initial stages of the war, the Norwegian economy 
benefited greatly because of its official neutral stance during the war. This positioned 
Norwegian merchant fleet strategically to make significant economic gains. The success of 
the Norwegian ship owners was as a result of the kind of protection they enjoyed from the 
British during the first years of the war. This was because Norway also in return gave special 
privileges to the British and its allies at the time of the war. Consequently Germany declared 
war against collaborating vessels and this affected Norway to a greater extent; there were 
huge economic losses. These coupled with the post war global recession had serious 
economic consequences on Norway as a country. The impact was huge because of the 
openness and small nature of the economy which made it very sensitive to the global 
economic crises. Norway’s major trade partners (Britain and Sweden) were seriously hit by 
the economic recession which also accounted for the depth of the impact on Norway. The 
economy was hit so hard that there were a lot of bankruptcies, financial crises and 
subsequently mass unemployment. Unemployment rate rose from almost one to 8 percent 
with the manufacturing sector surging up to more than 18 percent in 1919 and 1927 
respectively (Grytten, 2010). Unemployment and underemployment grew and stayed high (11 
percent in 1933) partly because of the restrictions placed on the movement of the growing 
labour force to North America by North American countries in the 1920s and thereafter. This 
perhaps caused the serious labour clashes in 1931.  
The Norwegian economy was still struggling to recover when it was invaded by the Germans 
during the Second World War in 1940. This caused the royal family and the government to 
escape to Britain. The country’s economy slipped into the control of the Germans. 
Consequently there were great political and economic imbalances which amounted to poorer 
standard of living among the unemployed, underemployed and employed in the primary 
sector, domestic service and households.  
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The postwar era witnessed serious efforts to reconstruct and rebuild the political and 
economic order. The Labour party which came to office from 1935 was committed to social 
democratic rule; public sector and centralized economic planning with a reconstruction 
agenda. Norway was a major beneficiary of the Marshall Aid program (in terms of per capita) 
after they rejected an aid proposal from the United States earlier on. Four hundred million 
dollars as part of the marshal aid program was received by Norway from 1948 to 1952. 
Norway as the highest beneficiary in per capita terms received 136 US dollars per person 
(Moyo, 2009). The acceptance of the marshal plan was necessitated by the lack of hard 
currencies to embark on the desired reconstruction. Moreover, Norway joined most of the 
international organizations (GATT, IMF, World Bank, United Nations, NATO and EFTA). 
The economic situation was relatively stable with 3.3 percentage growth rate, stable 
inflationary and low unemployment rates. However, the economic growth rate was not as high 
as other western European countries. The reconstruction brought about a better social security 
and even distribution of wealth among the populace in the framework of the Nordic model- 
welfare states. Therefore, can the egalitarian nature of the Norwegian society be attributed to 
the effects of World War II? From then there was steady and impressive growth in the midst 
of institutional fortification. At that time Norway could perhaps be classified as relatively 
young state with stronger institutions and democratic values.  
It can be argued that the effects of (the German invasion) the WWII on Norway have 
contributed to the egalitarian nature of the society. The war had devastating effects and 
virtually destroyed the economic fortunes of almost all Norwegians. They started afresh from 
ground zero with a strong national socialist policy in the context of the Nordic model; a 
Universalist welfare state (i.e. state takes a centre stage in the re/distribution of wealth). As a 
result, almost all citizens were carried along the developmental process without any 
significant class difference. However in recent times there have been worrying concerns about 
the gradual widening of gap between the rich and the poor.   
3.2 The Norwegian Petroleum Experience and Politics 
The American petroleum company (Philips) arrived in Norway in 1962 to seek license to 
explore oil and gas in the Norwegian continental shelf. Meanwhile four years prior to that 
time, leading geologists in Norway had declared that same area as almost impossible to find 
oil there. So Norway was concerned with how to use foreign interest without missing the 
target of development since they didn’t have the capacity to explore the resources on their 
own. With this in mind, Philips Petroleum Company was denied securing a monopoly or 
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central position in the Norwegian petroleum sector. This was apparently due to what had 
happened to Denmark in giving monopoly to a single consortium to extract petroleum in the 
prospective Danish continental shelf. Therefore other foreign companies were allowed in, 
however local participation was minimized (apparently avoided) at that time. Because it was a 
huge risk for the relatively weaker (financially) Norwegian companies to embark on such 
capital intensive project without the assurance of success at the end. They could be force out 
of business if they are unable to make any meaningful discovery. After all, the state will tax 
the foreign companies when a discovery is made. Moreover the government wanted to avoid 
too much demand for the local currency due to the capital intensive nature of the exploration 
and subsequently leading to the appreciation of the Norwegian Kroner, which could 
consequently suffocate the other traditional sectors of the economy – Dutch Disease. 
(Interviews with Øystein Kristiansen of NPD and Ryggvik, Helge of University of Oslo; 
TIK). All these happened with little attention of the general public. Nonetheless, no incident 
of corruption has been detected from the interactions between the state’s officials and the oil 
companies’ representatives (Ryggvik 2010).  
In spite of the frantic efforts mixed with desperate failures, the discovery of Ekofisk (the then 
biggest oil field in Europe) was finally made in 1969. Before then, frustrations and 
disappointments forced several companies out of exploration after 33 wells drilled were dry 
without any sign of commercial discovery. But before then, Norway saw the urgency to 
clarify the elasticity of their sovereignty in terms of territory. Border uncertainties had to be 
settled before there could be any possibility for Norway to collect rent from any resource to 
be found in that territory. As a result Norway did not rush but rather took time to negotiate 
with the parties involved (especially with Britain and Denmark) based on mutually benefiting 
agreement in the framework of the Geneva conventions’ equidistance principles (Ryggvik, 
  2010). 
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Source: http://subseaworldnews.com 30/05/2012 
Figure 1. The Borderlines indicating Norwegian territory with respect to UK and 
Denmark. 
3.2.1 National Control 
The issue of national control was not a difficult one to establish due to the already existing 
law called the Waterfall Act. This was the guiding principle for the government in giving out 
concession of their hydro power resource. So it was politically and economically prudent to 
conform to such law in the allocation of concessions with respect to oil and gas resources. 
This law (The Waterfall Act) required that water bodies and lands along them acquired by 
private entities will be returned to the state after a certain number of years. This is because the 
Norwegian waterfalls have been given by nature and must go to the state or the public, but not 
a private individual or body.          
Once the discovery was made in the North Sea in 1969, an aggressive national policy to 
strengthen Norwegian expertise came to break the foreign hegemony in this important and 
strategic sector. Consequently, the oil companies were not very satisfied with subsequent 
allocation of concessions after the Ekofisk discovery. Thus the conditions for the American 
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oil companies were tightened in favour of the Norwegian interest. From then, issues of oil 
moved from the confines of the few technocrats (officials) to all layers of the Norwegian 
society.  
 
Source: Facts 2012, The Norwegian petroleum sector. 
Figure 2. The management structure of the Norwegian petroleum sector 
 
At that time Norway through the industrial committee of its parliament (Storting) designed in 
1971 the Ten Oil Commandments as the guiding principles for the petroleum resource 
management to benefit the entire Norwegian society.  
 That national management and control must be secured over all operations on the 
Norwegian continental shelf.  
 That petroleum discoveries are exploited in a way which minimizes Norway's depende
nce on others for crude oil supplies.  
 That new industrial activities should be developed on the basis of petroleum.  
 That development of an oil industry must take the necessary account of existing indust
rial operations and of protecting nature and the environment.  
 That ﬂaring of usable gas on the Norwegian continental shelf must not be accepted  
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except for brief periods of testing.  
 That petroleum from the Norwegian continental shelf must, as a main rule, be landed  
in Norway with the exception of individual cases where national policy concerns call  
for a deferent solution.  
 That the state becomes involved at all appropriate levels, and contributes to a coordina
tion of national interests in the Norwegian petroleum industry as well as the creation 
of an integrated Norwegian petroleum community which sets its sights both nationally
 and internationally.  
 That a state oil company be established to take care of the state's commercial interests 
and to maintain suitable collaboration with domestic and international petroleum  
interests.   
 That a pattern of activity be selected north of the 62nd parallel [i.e., outside the North 
Sea] which satisﬁes the special policy concerns that apply in this region.  
 That Norwegian petroleum discoveries on a large scale could add new dimensions to 
Norway's foreign policy.  
Source: Stortingsmelding 1971 (unoﬃcial translation by NPD 2000) 
From the outset Norway was interested in finding ways to gain a total national control over 
the petroleum activities. Because it saw that it was not enough to only tax the foreign oil 
companies, there was also the need to create a 100% state-owned oil company which is 
supposed to be very active and quick to master the required expertise and technology in the 
petroleum industry. After the Ekofisk discovery in 1969, another significant discovery was to 
be made in the Brent Sea (Statfjord), since there was a very strong indication of oil find when 
Britain made a great discovery on their side (boundary line) of the same sea. There was a lot 
of dissatisfaction among the foreign oil companies because their expectations were not met 
when the newly established Norwegian oil company (STATOIL) was given 50% ownership 
of this very promising block. Shell, Esso, Conoco and Mobil got 10%, 10%, 11% and 15% 
shares respectively. Meanwhile Shell and Esso had tried in early 1973 to secure blocks in the 
same field after the discovery at the British side was made but were denied. They were a bit 
relieved once the Statfjord discovery proved to be one of the greatest discoveries in the world, 
so even small percentages meant huge profit.  
Statoil as a new oil company was paired with Mobil in their operations for ten years when 
Statoil would be fully capable to take charge. This pairing was meant to help Statoil acquired 
25 
 
the technological know-how in the petroleum industry. These were the primary school days 
for Statoil in petroleum activities (Interview with Kristin Øye Gjerda, Petroleum Museum in 
Stavanger 20/04/12). Meanwhile it took a little over ten years for Statoil to fully take 
operational control. This pairing was reluctantly accepted by Mobil but for Statoil having the 
majority share, the richness of the Statfjord field and a clause in the agreement. Fourth round 
of concession gave Statoil 91% share of Gullfask field whilst it used Esso as an assistant with 
respect to technology. The other 9% went to Norsk Hydro making it a 100% Norwegian 
ownership. Again, Mobil was made to give the engineering task on Statfjord B to a new 
Norwegian engineering firm (Norwegian Petroleum Consultants) based on the pressure from 
Statoil’s share. A similar incident happened again when an originally Norwegian ship 
building firm (Aker and now Aker Solutions) was also paired with an American company 
(Brown & Root) in the construction of Statfjord A due to same Statoil’s pressure as a result of 
it being the majority share holder. Due to the Norwegian government’s intention to fully 
benefit from the economic rent from its petroleum resources by exercising high level of 
national participation, it was keen in exercising some level of protectionism both directly and 
indirectly.  
There was an arrangement that when you( a foreign oil company) took a license you accepted 
that anytime you made a discovery, depending on the size of the discovery, you had to give the 
state a part of license which could be higher the higher the discovery. So if you make a giant 
field discovery then you had to perhaps transfer 50% 0f the oil license to the government. And 
that part was more or less automatically transferred to Statoil. (Interview with Øystein 
Kristiansen NDP officer in charge of Ghana. 19/04/2012). 
Apart from this Statoil had its own share and still received additional shares anytime there 
was a discovery. This indicates that Norwegians were aware of how important it was to gain 
control over the rent that comes out of the exploitation of their oil resource. 
3.2.2 Minimizing Rent Seeking in Norway 
Rent seeking has been the bane of development caused by natural resource as well as the 
pathogen for the “resource curse”. Therefore there is the need to also present how Norway 
minimized it. Economic rent is usually appropriated in several ways by both local and 
external parties involved in the extractive activities. “Rent is the produce which is over what 
is necessary to pay the farmer ordinary profit” (Reich, 2000 pp166). Though I have already 
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explained the issue of rent in chapter six of this work, there is still the need to further 
elaborate it to set the grounds for a better understanding for the subsequent discussions.   
 
Figure 3 Explanation to economic rent from oil fields 
    
 The diagram above illustrates the theory of rent from two oil fields in a pictorial form. 
According to this diagram, the green parts of fields A and B are the economic rents which are 
supposed to go the states that own the natural resource (e.g. Oil and Gas) just because of their 
right of ownership. Because that is what is left to the people (owners) after taking into account 
the cost of production (Blue) and the ordinary profit (Red). This must go to the people 
because it is a gift bestowed on them by nature. But more often than not, countries endowed 
with such resources do not have the capacity to do the exploitation on their own. Foreign oil 
companies are allowed to extract at a cost (blue) depending on the nature of the oil field. 
Since the extractive activities in the oil fields by the companies is an investment which 
deserve positive returns, they are also rewarded with profits (Red) which is ordinary and a 
percentage or proportionate to the cost involved in the production.  
Field A  Field B 
Rent 
Profit 
Cost 
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What usually happens is the rent (green portion) becomes a target of all parties involved (both 
domestic and foreign interest) which creates a serious competition for it whether fair or foul 
means. In this sense the foreign oil companies try as much as they can to push their red zone 
(profit) as deep as possible into the green zone to maximize their profits. A typical example is 
when Philips (An American Oil Company) wanted to take control over the building of the 
pipelines that will transport the petroleum products to the European markets from Norway. It 
would have secured shares of the economic rent from the oil production in Norway by the 
mere virtue of fact that it owns the pipelines.  
It is not only the oil companies but other stake holders like, politicians, bureaucrats, 
communities, opinion leaders, war lords etc also try to take a swipe at the rent which ought to 
go to all and sundry ( i.e. the public). This is how stakeholders (parties involved in the oil and 
gas activities) seek rent at the expense of the people who (actually own it) and naturally 
deserve to benefit from it. The producing countries are often cheated. A classical example is;  
“State of Alabama v. Exxon Mobil Corp. A suit was whether or not Exxon could deduct 
production costs from royalty payments as well as deduct gas used to fuel the wells. The 
contract very clearly stated that they could not. Moreover, internal Exxon memos presented at 
trial suggested that they were aware of this and that they had conducted cost-benefit analysis 
of the likelihood of getting caught. The court found for Alabama, awarding 11.8 billion US 
dollars in punitive damages and 63.6 million in unpaid royalties. 
While such possibilities exist in the United States, many more possibilities for cheating exist 
in countries where institutions are weaker.”  Humphrey et al (2007 pp.25)  
The resource curse thesis literatures suggest that resource boom usually affects economies 
adversely in diverse ways. Auty (2001), Le Billion (2004) and Ross (2001) agree that incomes 
from natural resources tends to create or widen the gap between the ruled and the ruler ( the 
political elite). This is particularly to countries that do not have stronger and independent 
institutions already in place before exploitation begins. When institutions of this nature are 
not in place, there is the easy occurrence of corruption in the form of rent seeking, 
dictatorship, lack of investments etc. which consequently lead to poor economic growth. 
Again, Collier and Hoeffler (2002) and Ross (2001) also argue that greediness is a major 
cause of lack of positive correlation between resource boom and economic development. 
Individuals who get the opportunity to manage the revenue from these resources enrich 
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themselves with it at the expense of the general good of the masses. So the problem with 
development and natural resource is basically rent seeking. 
It has been found out that Norway was very much concerned with how to gain the maximum 
rent it deserves in spite using foreign oil companies. In order to maximize rent on behalf of 
the state, Norway was quick to create two important institutions i.e. Statoil and Norwegian 
Petroleum Directorate (NPD) at the very beginning of the exploitation activities. NPD serving 
as a regulatory body of the petroleum industry, it made sure the activities of companies 
involved were monitored in the interest of the Norwegian state. It carefully gave out 
concessions in a way that prevented a single oil company from gaining control over a 
concession or block. Concessions are deliberately opened for biding by more than one 
company to encourage competition and transparency.  As a respondent explains; 
(…….) You should not do what you normally do i.e. to have a single licensing group. 
Production sharing Agreement (PSA) system can also function with three, four partners 
without problem. Make them non-incorporated partners and independent. Make them control 
each other. They can do much control exercise much better than you ever can do. (Oystein 
Kristiansen of NPD, Stavanger; Officer in charge of Ghana and Cote D’Ivoire. 19/04/2012). 
With the several licensing groups, the companies involved serve as a check on each other 
which takes care of the problem of cost inflation and other illicit activities that reduces the 
rent of the state. Apart from this, stronger social and political activism to strictly demand 
accountability and accountability at the time of the discovery in Norway apparently did not 
give such agents any incentive to seek rent from the oil and gas exploitation. Larsen (2004) 
explains social norms, transparent democracy, proper monitoring system, an effective judicial 
system and the wage negotiation system reduced the frequency of rent seeking. This is 
because people are normally motivated to seek rent when they; feel neglected by the political 
elites, realize little or no demand for accountability, find weaknesses in the state institutions 
etc. But at the time of the discovery, Norway had developed its institutions to be very strong 
and independent through democratic governance.  
These together with the creation of Statoil (State-owned Oil Company in Norway) made 
Norway gain a total control over its petroleum resources. That is Statoil came as major 
competitor to the foreign oil companies, therefore it gave Norway an alternative and 
negotiating tool whenever they were dealing with the profit oriented foreign companies. With 
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Statoil in place the foreign oil companies felt threatened since they could easily be replaced if 
they demanded too much during negotiations. This apparently reduced the potential of the oil 
companies to secure rent after the ordinary profit. Also the strict demand for accountability 
through a strong social and political activism might have been the cause of minimal or no 
activity identified as corrupt or a rent seeking one. However, Norway was also mindful of 
how to make sure the money which was generated did not serve as the only source of state 
revenue and consequently cause Dutch disease. 
3.2.3 Curbing the Dutch Disease in Norway 
Dutch disease is when boom from natural resource crowds out the other sectors of the 
economy especially the manufacturing sector. Scholars have observed that resource exports 
tend to lead to rapid contraction of the non-resource traded goods of the economy of a 
country. Røed Larsen (2004) explains that the Dutch Disease is intricately linked to factor 
movement, spending effect and spillover-loss effect. The factor movement is the diversion of 
factors of production like labour and capital from other activities to resource extraction. The 
spending effect is an excessive demand for domestic currency borne out of resource receipts 
which causes the domestic currency to appreciate and consequently making the manufacturing 
sector noncompetitive. The spillover-loss effect comes as a result of loss of positive 
externalities (as a result of the crowding out of the other sectors) linked to the non-oil traded 
goods sector.  
I will present and discuss how; the factor movement was limited, the spillover effect was dealt 
with and spending effect was curbed in Norway. 
i) Factor Movement: Factor movement could be said to have emerged right after the 
discovery in Norway. Because some local manufacturing industries like the ship building 
companies were converted to oil related companies as labour and capital were diverted to the 
new oil and gas industry. But a closer look at it indicates that the oil boom rather came to save 
the situation since most of the ship building companies were in deep economic crisis due to 
the global economic slowdown in terms of trade and lack of competitive power at that time. 
So the persistent rise in oil prices with high profit margins from 1973 and 1985 were good 
incentives for labour and capital to be diverted to the resource sector. Nonetheless, Norway 
being aware of the consequences of high rate of factor movement, it had measures in place to 
limit it. It had a highly centralized wage negotiation system and income coordinating scheme 
to have arrested the situation (Larsen, 2004). Thus it made sure the oil industry did not create 
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any significant wage disparity between it and the other sectors of the economy. Again, 
employers and employees’ unions were encouraged to be aware of the effect of wage 
negotiations based on their special interest at the expense of the effect on the aggregate 
economy. This was perhaps done through moral suasion.   
ii) Spending effect: Since oil booms are usually accompanied by huge spending which leads to 
appreciation of real exchange rate and consequently, the manufacturing and agriculture 
sectors becoming noncompetitive. The Norwegian government established a fund (The 
Pension Fund- Global) to put in check the level of spending the economy can tolerate in order 
to avoid over heating of the economy. With this fund the surplus income from the oil 
production is invested outside of Norway to reduce its impact on the Norwegian economy. 
That is meant to reduce excessive demand, spending and real appreciation. However the fund 
was not established at the onset of the petroleum exploitation in Norway. Exploitation begun 
in 1969, the fund was established in 1990 and the first net deposit was made in 1996. This 
implies the need to reinvest some of the initial incomes accrued from the petroleum resource 
in strategic areas of the economy to cause positive social and economic impact on the society 
before surplus ought to be saved.  
iii) Spillover-loss effect: Usually the appreciation of the real exchange rate as a result of 
excessive spending, the manufacturing sector tends to be crowded out. In order to cut cost by 
reducing some of the activities that increase expenditure, the government was quick to 
substitute the demand for foreign expertise (expatriate workers and technology) with local 
content. Attention was rightly given to educating local people (Norwegians) to acquire the 
needed skills across board of the labour stratum of the petroleum industry. Both highly skilled 
and slightly skilled labourers in the relevant fields were trained in Norway. Because for 
example if two engineers are hired about twenty vocationally and/or technically trained or 
ordinary workers will also be required. Therefore attention was given to not only highly 
skilled labour but also the slightly skilled workers. Emphasis was put on accumulation and 
progress of technological know-how, knowledge and human capital. Also the economy 
maintained a diverse export base.  
3.3 Institutional Building 
Several ministries and bodies were involved in the petroleum activities at the initial stages of 
exploration and exploitation. Again the political regime of Norway took time to clearly assign 
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well define roles to various institutions, organization and ministries. However, this did not 
happen in few years but has gone through several years of experience. After the discovery at 
the North Sea (Ekofisk), measures were put in place to establish 100% state owned Oil 
Company to secure and entrench national participation. Parliament (Storting) of Norway 
resolved to create a state own oil company (Statoil) in June, 1972. This was in accordance 
with the ten oil Commandments. In this same year parliament again resolved to establish a 
separate petroleum directorate. Thus; Norwegian Petroleum Directorate (NPD) was in charge 
of the administration and management of the petroleum resources. It also had the 
responsibility of serving as a very important advisory body to the state. Thus, it was 
established to regulate the petroleum activities on the Norwegian continental shelf, however 
the Norwegian Ministry of Petroleum and Energy has the overall responsibility over the 
management of the petroleum resources on the continental shelf of Norway. Another state 
owned body (Gassco) was also established to be in charge of the transportation of gas from 
the Norwegian continental shelf. Statoil was quick to adapt to the challenges of the petroleum 
industry and this was perhaps due to unflinching support it received from the state. Sooner 
than later, it (Statoil) became extremely powerful (in terms of finances) independent state-
owned company which was later perceived to be a threat to the state itself. Consequently, the 
government introduced the State Direct Financial Interest (SDFI); Statoil had to give back to 
the state part of the ownership in many other fields. This led to the establishment of Petoro to 
take on the responsibility of managing the share of the SDFI. 
It is in the right direction to have institutions with well defined roles in the management of 
natural resource like oil and gas. However, the mere existence of such institutions cannot 
bring out the full potential of the resource with respect to economic development due to 
corruption. Corruption is widely accepted in a significant degree, as the hall mark of the oil 
and gas business (Humphreys et al, 2007). Due to the huge cash inflow that usually comes 
with the exploitation of oil and gas, there is always the tendency for the political elites to line 
their pockets with the economic rent from the resource. This to some extent can be attributed 
to what Ross (2001) explains as states that depend much on natural resources or other source 
of revenue like foreign aid are often less accountable to the citizens as a result of little or no 
taxes from the citizenry. In spite of this, Norway is yet to discover a corrupt practice of such 
kind (Ryggvik, 2010).   
Unlike the others, Norway had a society with relatively higher rate of education at the time of 
the oil discovery (Interview with Kristin Øye Gjerde, Norwegian Petroleum Museum, 
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20/04/12) compared to Ghana. At the same time Norway was going through political 
turbulence; frequent change of government through the ballot (four governments between 
winter 1971 and Autum 1973) and general radicalization in the youth culture (Ryggvik, 
2010). Due to the high rate of literacy, issues of petroleum activities were of great concern to 
the general public especially the labour organizations therefore demand for accountability and 
transparency was high.  
Furthermore, the Norwegian economy was, not or less dependent of foreign assistance. Taxes 
were the main source of state revenue. Therefore demand for accountability was very high 
from the start. These factors combined with the break of hegemony of the oil companies in 
favour of the nation state at the time, played a crucial role in shaping the Norwegian 
petroleum management experience. There was a strong linkage between the society and the 
government due to activism of individuals, social groups (especially the trade unions and 
labour organization) and the other political forces like the political parties especially the 
opposition. These helped mobilize forces to put the political leaders in check. Again, this 
might have been the cause of the yet to be detected corrupt and the iconic Norwegian 
petroleum experience.   
The first phase of the petroleum activities in Norway was dominated by foreign Companies. 
Odeco; an American company which owned the rigs and drills used by many of the oil 
companies was only forced (as they brought experienced workers from Gulf of Mexico) to 
hire a number Norwegian oil workers. The authorities were concerned about Norwegian jobs 
from the start.  
3.4 Key Political Decisions 
It is acceptable that several factors must have contributed to the Norwegian petroleum 
experience. It is also equally important to note that there are some major political decisions or 
events that might have significantly induced the Norwegian success in the petroleum resource 
management. It was not for nothing that entourage from the West African state of Benin came 
to Norway (in 1978) to find out about how it had built independent oil know how within a 
shortest period of time (Ryggvik, 2010). The following go a long way to explain some of the 
reasons why Norway achieved an international recognition in resource governance as early as 
1978.   
 Moderate Pace of extraction. It is not least that Norway now enjoys a role model status 
in the world of the many petroleum producing states. Many are those who are unable 
33 
 
to resist the temptation of the luxury of quick extraction- huge income flow. The 
rationale behind the Norwegian decision not to have quick tempo of extraction was to 
minimize the conversion cost (Dutch disease) of transforming the traditional economy 
to a petroleum dependent economy. Again, it was also meant to avoid the incidence of 
having nothing left before the state gets the capacity and competence to exploit its 
own resource in a efficient manner. This was done by carefully giving out concession 
in a very competitive and transparent manner. However the current pace of extraction 
now is not as it used to be in the first two decades of oil production in Norway. Things 
changed after the establishment of the pension fund in the 1990s. 
 Establishment of state-owned petroleum company. The vision of Norway achieving a 
“qualitatively better society” was to be realized by making sure the rent that comes 
from the resource goes to the state but not the foreign oil companies. And it was also 
through the state-owned Oil Company that political decisions could be implemented 
effectively in balancing the power of the foreign oil companies.  
 
 Securing ownership of the pipelines (Statpipe). It initially seemed impossible for 
Norway to realize its intension of having most of the petroleum activities happen on 
its shores (onshore). This relied on the difficulty of laying pipes across the deep water 
Norwegian Trench from the Ekofisk field in the North Sea. But persistence and 
confrontational negotiations between the government and the foreign oil companies 
coupled with quick technological advancement led to the piping of oil and gas by 
Statoil from Statfjord and Gullfaks fields to Norwegian coastal towns like Kårstø 
(north of Stavanger), Kolsnes, Stura, Mongstad, Tjellbergodden etc. This was done 
across the same Norwegian Trench which the foreign oil companies (especially 
Philips) had argued that it was practically not feasible to lay pipes across. From then, 
gas has been piped through the Statpipe system to the European market. This further 
entrenched the total dominance of Norway in its oil and gas activities. This is how the 
profit oriented foreign oil companies bulldoze their interest through by hiding behind 
technological arguments during negotiations with respect to petroleum activities. 
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Source:    http://www.npd.no/Templates/OD/Article.aspx?id=2797&epslanguage=en 
02/06/2012. 
Figure 4 Distribution of pipelines from Norway to other parts of Europe 
 The creation of The Pension fund- Global. In order to prevent the Norwegian economy 
from overheating due to excessive spending (cash flow).This fund was established to 
put in check the level of spending the economy can tolerate. So that the Dutch disease 
could be avoided by investing the monies outside of Norway. It was designed to 
carefully separate income generation from revenue use. 
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 The Tax system. The government of Norway made sure the oil companies only 
benefited from the normal taxable profits on their investments. Thus the rent from 
their resources which belongs to the people was safeguarded. An attempt by the 
government to introduce a calculated tax around 80% (now 78%; with corporation tax 
28% and Special tax 50%) was aggressively and loudly protested against by the oil 
companies, even with a threat of withdrawal. But with the experience the state had 
gained from its previous negotiations with the foreign oil companies (especially on the 
pipelines) gave the state enough reason to pursue their interest. Not only did Norway 
introduce the tax, it made sure the right records (Income and expenditure) are kept. It 
was keen in making sure no single company owned a concession alone but rather in 
groups. This was meant to facilitate companies control over each other in a concession 
group. So that expenditure figures are not inflated to reduce the taxable profits as it is 
occasionally done by some of the international oil companies. 
 
 High level of Social and Political activism. Since politics is a social game, the level of 
political activism in the Norwegian society was then extremely high at that time i.e. at 
the formation stages of its petroleum experience. Such activities in the body politics of 
Norway converge as a key element to have shaped the Norwegian approach to oil 
management. Civil organizations like the Labour Union, Oil workers’ union, 
environmentalists etc were well grounded at the time and were very active in the day 
to day activities of the Norwegian state; therefore the demand for civil rights and 
accountability was not farfetched. The current nature of the Norwegian petroleum 
experience can never be elaborated without the mention of the importance of the 
conflicts between the oil actors and the society. i.e. the society was determined to 
secure it own power and position in relation to the big companies (Ryggvik,2010 p 
113). Several strikes actions by the oil workers took place at the formative stages of 
the oil industries and the significant one among them is;  
 
“On May 20th 1978, the workers on the Eldfisk platform on the Ekofisk field
  stopped work, in an illegal wildcat strike. The immediate occasion  
 for the strike was a British foreman struck a Norwegian. Land-based  
 management immediately sent a helicopter to talk the workers down.  
 Instead, the action was intensified. 400 Spanish speaking workers  
 took sympathy action, with a go-slow and refusal to carry out the   
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 work the Norwegians should have done. The foreman was transferred,  
 but the event was the straw that broke the camel’s back”   
 (Ryggvik, 2010 p: 67). 
 
Things could have been different by now if such actions did not take place in the petro- 
politics of Norway.  
        
3.5 The Environment and the Norwegian Petroleum Experience 
 
Petroleum resource has significant economic importance that can change the fortune of a 
whole nation in a very positive direction. But the exploitation of it can also come with serious 
negative consequences on the environment if care is not taken. Petroleum waste can serve as a 
serious pollutant to the environment; land or sea (i.e. the ecosystem). Environmental 
degradation caused by substance from petroleum activities are either accidental or deliberate 
spill from offshore or onshore platforms, pipes, tankers (ships) and emission of gases ( 
flaring) etc.  Such incidence negatively affects lives (aquatic, air and land). 
Norway is not only one of the few countries that have used petroleum resource to benefit 
society immensely, but it’s also one of the few countries with best practices of 
environmentally safety precautions with respect to petroleum activities. It is recognized as the 
one of the world’s cleanest petroleum provinces (MPE 2010 -2011) though arguable. This is 
due to the strong governmental regulations right from the start of the petroleum production. A 
lot of wastes are usually generated from petroleum activity like drill cutting, produced water 
and remnants of chemical and cement from drilling operations but measures have been put in 
place to make sure that no harmful substance that can affect the environment is released. 
Consequently, zero discharge target was established in 1997 by the Norwegian government 
(MPE, 2010 - 2011). Furthermore, radioactive substances were also included in the zero 
discharge target in 2009. Some of the petroleum activities that cause emission into air are 
combustion of gas in turbines, flaring of gases and consumption of diesel and other fuels. Gas 
is re-injected but not flared except for testing. That is, flaring is only permitted for safety 
reasons. There is a state body (The Climate and Pollution Agency) which is in charge of 
granting discharge permit for chemicals to be discharged into the sea. The permits are granted 
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in pursuant to the Pollution Control Act which requires operators to be responsible for 
establishing an emergency preparedness to respond to an acute pollution. However, there are 
also state and municipal emergency preparedness in place. Due to these measures total 
discharges of oil from petroleum activities into the North Sea accounts for about only 5% 
(FACTS 2012). The Norwegian Coastal Administration is responsible for receiving reports 
and investigates any cause of acute discharge.  But so far petroleum activities have not caused 
any environmental damage through an acute discharge of oil and gas in Norway. Again the 
petroleum activity on the continental shelf of Norway is also one of the few with low level of 
emission or discharge of gases, chemicals and compounds. Authorities and the oil companies 
have resorted to working together in researching to find technology that can help reducing 
harmful emissions. This has put Norway at the forefront of using environmentally and climate 
friendly methods in her extraction. There is an agreement (2002) between the oil companies 
and the authorities in Norway to use the best available technology (BAT) in a cost effective 
manner. This has led to shuttle tankers installing Non methane Volatile Organic Compound 
(nmVOC) reducing technology. Now this technology helps to reduce emission from loading 
by 70%. A tax system has also been set up to reduce emission of gases CO2 and NOx. 
Companies are taxed based on the amount of tones emitted.    
Though Safety and environmental issues were of major concern to authorities (politicians and 
civil servants) it did not take precedence over the turbulent and construction phase of the 
petroleum activities of the initial stages. It took a bit of time for regulations to be put in place. 
It was until 1978 that regulations for divers in the oil sector was established, however safety 
framework had already been established by parliament in 1966 and that was even before the 
first rig was drilled. Thus it is not as if Norway started off on a note of excellence with respect 
to safety and environment. There have been bad times for the Norwegian petroleum sector 
when it comes to safety matters. Incidences of catastrophe are not uncommon but not 
prevalent in the petroleum history of Norway. Between 1965 and 1978 82 workers had died of 
petroleum related activities with the development of Ekofisk alone taking 45 lives (1971 to 
1977) Ryggvik, 2010. Again, the loss of control on the Bravo platform of Ekofisk by Philips 
during drilling led to an 8 day oil spill in 1977. This fortunately did not cause any serious 
disaster like what happened to USA in 2010. The most traumatic and unprecedented accident 
in the Norwegian petroleum history was in March, 1980. This happened on the Edda field of 
Ekofisk when the Alexander L Kielland accommodation rig was hit by disaster (capsized 
upside down within 24 minutes)  in a very bad weather ( freezing cold) and killed 123 people 
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whilst 83 survived ( The Petroleum Museum, Stavanger).  This is popularly known as The 
black days in the Norwegian oil history. 
All these come together as lessons to have shaped the experiences of Norway in the context of 
petroleum activities. It is not the case that Norway got everything right from the start but has 
gone a long way in adjusting to itself to the necessities of situations and times. Whilst 
environmental and safety concerns took a central position at the parliamentary debates, 
Norway still struggled with the enforcement of the Working environment act. There were 
struggles between the government and the oil companies as to who was to bear responsibility 
of regulation. Finally, a consensus was formed between the Working Environment Act, 
Pollution Act and issues of self regulation by oil companies. These and other several 
challenges were those that confronted the people of Norway with respect to environmental 
and safety matters.    
3.6 The Norwegian Petroleum Experience and Education 
Petroleum discoveries often heighten the hopes of the citizenry when it comes to employment 
opportunities. But the employment opportunities the petroleum activities offer require skills 
which are diversified in nature. Thus it requires high level of expertise (engineers, geologist, 
accountants, economists, computer engineers etc) as well as other services providers. 
Therefore there is usually the need for states to direct or redirect the focus of their educational 
system to suit the demands of the new industry whenever there is a commercial discovery. If 
this is not done properly, the state often ceases to fully benefit from the opportunities the new 
industry (petroleum) usually brings about. It is in this background that education plays a 
decisive role in making sure resource does not become a curse but rather a blessing. 
The issue of local content was in focus in the very early stages of the petroleum activities in 
Norway. The aimed was at 70% local content. But before that could be realized there was the 
need to have an educational system that could supply the required skills to the new national 
petroleum industry. It is for a fact that Norway had an existing (shipping) industry that was 
less difficult to transform itself to adjust to some of the needs of the new petroleum industry. 
Therefore the discovery came as good news for the shipyard workers like welders, divers, 
engineers and so on. Employment readily came to such people when most of the Norwegian 
shipping companies sought for contracts in the prospecting rigs. Several rigs were built in the 
shipyards along the coast of Norway.  
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But that was not enough for Norwegian workers to rise to the strategic positions to necessarily 
augment national control. It was quite uneasy for Norway to find local experts to occupy 
various positions of the newly established industry due to the limited nature of the Norwegian 
know-how in this particular area, therefore American experts were hired. The recruitment was 
carefully made to make sure these people had no connections with Mobil (Ryggvik, 2010). It 
was in this background that a strong national support for training in petroleum-related courses 
and the establishment of state research institutes were created. The educational system was 
also quick to adapt to the necessities at the time. The technical college of Trondheim (NTH) 
introduced engineering courses to meet the demands of the new oil industry especially Statoil. 
Also, universities of Oslo and Bergen shifted the focus the researches of their geology 
departments from bedrock which was peculiar to Norway to sedimentary rocks where oil 
could be found (Ryggvik, 2010).  
Not only did Norway focus on higher level of education for the highly skilled personnel in the 
new industry, it also gave an equal priority to training of middle and low level workers like 
electricians, plumbers, welders, drivers etc. These levels on the employment stratum are what 
offer lager portion of employment to the people. The middle, lower level workers and other 
services providers were all important in ensuring that the local content ambition was 
achieved. The first Norwegian company to have secured a contract in the petroleum industry 
was a catering company from Oslo (Christiana Dampkjøkken), Ryggvik, (2010). As Oystein 
Kristiansen of NPD in Stavanger noted in my interview with him, that Angola for instance 
import such low and middle class workers like plumbers, electricians, welders, carpenters etc 
from outside looking at the years they have been producing oil. Meanwhile it doesn’t take 
longer time to train the local youth (who are usually idle or lack employable skills) to get 
them jobs in the petroleum industry instead of them being used as agents of conflicts. This 
conforms to Collier’s argument that states with quite a number of idle youth who are 
(unemployed) are easy to degenerate into wars/conflicts, because they are easily lured into 
conflicts with little or even with no incentive.  
This is not say that this is strictly the way to go when it comes to making sure that states 
endowed with petroleum resource fully benefit from them. But huge lessons can be drawn 
from them since every country has got its own experience. Ghana for instance has gotten its 
own developmental agenda in the framework of particular historical and political experience. 
With this what lessons are there for Ghana as a petroleum producing state to learn from? The 
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chapter below takes a look at Ghana in terms of how such lessons from Norway could be 
drawn to assist Ghana in its oil and gas activities.  
3.7 Conclusion 
The Norwegian petroleum experience has been shaped by several incidences. Basically it 
seems difficult to secure the greatest possible share of oil rent by most of the producing states 
which are usually at a weak negotiation positions at the time of discovery. This is due to the 
fact initial stages of exploitation are normally dominated by foreign (interest) investors. It is 
in this light that, Norway designed policies to make sure the foreign oil companies which 
invested their technology and capital only earn the average rate of profit.   
In all, it is definitely not wrong for a country endowed with oil and gas resource to look up to 
Norway as a model in making sure that such resources turn out to be a blessing but not curse. 
But this must be done with some level of meticulousness due to the dynamics of the various 
settings and times. It is also incontrovertible to accept that the Norwegian petroleum industry 
offers experiences which are universally valuable. However some of the decisions and actions 
of the Norwegian government in the early stages of their petroleum production (1970s) can 
hardly be replicated in recent times. A classical example is the compatibility of the Waterfall 
Act of Norway with EEA (European Economic Area) Agreement was challenged in the EFTA 
(European Free Trade Association) Court in 2007
1
. These are some of things which render the 
Norwegian petroleum experience as what I called “not an already made formula or recipe” for 
the avoidance the so called resource curse in the context of the current phenomenon called 
globalization or what I call “supranationalism”. Again the difference in the geopolitical 
ecologies of Norway and any other country especially Ghana must be put in a context of time 
whenever there is an attempt to use Norway as model.   
    
 
 
                                                     
1
 (www.eftacourt.int/images/uploads/PR05_EN.pdf Accessed 14/11/12). 
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Chapter Four 
Ghana in Perspective 
4.0 Introduction 
The African continent, specifically West Africa is one of the richest regions in the world in 
terms of natural resource abundance. Gold, diamond, manganese, bauxite, petroleum etc are 
some of the resources the West African region is endowed with. At the same time, it is also 
one of the volatile regions with respect to conflicts, wars, hunger, diseases, poverty etc. The 
causes of conflict are diversified in nature. It ranges from historical animosity, colonial 
legacies, forces of globalization and global governance, post-colonial realities and external 
agencies (Omeje, 2005). Again the Atlantic slave trade is one of the phenomena that have had 
a devastating effect on the political and economic architecture of the people of the West 
African societies. There has been the experience of terrible political instability within states in 
this particular region. Thus from multi party democracy just after independence, through to 
military and one party dictatorships and later back to multi party democracy. These are the 
experiences most of the states in this location can hardly disassociate themselves from. Ghana 
as a major player in the political and economic affairs of Africa is never an exception to these 
turn of events. 
This chapter takes a deep look at the political and economic history of Ghana. This will bring 
to bear the Ghanaian politico-economic realities in order to help contextualize the petroleum 
experience of Norway in the Ghanaian situation in a better manner. It will highlight the 
resource management style of Ghana that is relevant to the management of the current 
petroleum boom and as to what lessons can be learnt from it. How and when Ghana started 
exploring for petroleum resources will also be addressed.  
4.1 The Ghanaian Petroleum Experience  
The news of the discovery of oil in commercial quantities in 2007 was welcome with mixed 
reactions. The experiences of countries like Nigeria, Angola, Equatorial Guinea etc are 
usually juxtaposed with the advantages of production of petroleum in commercial quantities. 
Consequentially, Ghana is keen in making sure that lessons are learnt from those negative 
experiences in order to fully benefit from the possible advantages of oil and gas production. It 
is the desire of Ghanaians to break the cycle of the presumed resource curse phenomenon that 
has been denying most African countries the very benefits of the resources in their disposal.  
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Ghana as a petroleum (oil and gas) consuming state has a long history of consistent attempts 
to change the situation to become a net exporter. Unsuccessful explorations attempt were 
made in the Tano Basin (now the western region of Ghana) as far back as 1896 (Boateng, 
2008). Lack of better technology and little geological knowledge then, led to the failure to 
make any discovery in the oil and gas seepage basin. Hopes were again revived in the 1960s 
by successive governments in their quest to find petroleum in commercial quantity. But no 
success was registered until the establishment of Ghana National Petroleum Cooperation 
(GNPC). 
In 1983, GNPC was established by the Provision National Defence Council (PNDC) Laws 64 
and 84. The PNDC Law 64 mandates the GNPC to undertake petroleum exploration, 
development, production and disposal. This led to the discovery at the Saltpond Fields with 
the current production capacity of about 600 barrels per day. The GNPC operates with the 
support of the PNDC Law 84 in establishing the legal framework in guiding the contractual 
relationship between the State, GNPC and prospective investors in the petroleum industry. 
With this, though slow and sporadic but consistent attempts were made in the discovery of 
petroleum in larger quantities. It was in June 2007 that the people of Ghana were informed 
about the positive results of agreement signed in 2004 between the Ministry of Energy of 
Ghana and Kosmos Energy HC and its partners. The estimated recoverable reserves of the 
Jubilee Field were over 370 million barrels. Its location is 60km offshore between the 
Deepwater Tano and West Cape Three Points blocks.  
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Source: http://crossedcrocodiles.wordpress.com/2009/07/16/ghanas-jubilee-oil-field/  
Accessed: 28/02/2012 
Figure 5 Borderlines of the Ghanaian territory and the oil fields.  
The equity of the two main oil blocks among the partners in the jubilee field are distributed as 
follows; The Deepwater Tano Block: Tullow 49.95%, Kosmos 18%, Anadarko 18%, Sabre 
Oil and Gas 4.05% and Ghana National Petroleum Cooperation (GNPC) 10%. 
West Cape Three Points; Tullow 22.9%, Kosmos 30.88%, Anadarko 30.88%, Sabre Oil and 
Gas 1.85%, GNPC 10% and EO Group 3.5% 
2
 
Since Ghana joined the pool of oil producing countries, there have been attempts to search for 
the best management practice in the petroleum revenue to avoid the mistakes of most of the 
oil producing states. As a result of this, Acticle 815 (The Petroleum Revenue Management 
Act) was passed by the parliament of Ghana in 2011. This is to ensure the collection, 
                                                     
2
 (www.offshoretechnology.com ).accessed 28/02/12 
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allocation and management of petroleum revenue in a responsible, transparent, accountable 
and sustainable manner to benefit the citizens of Ghana. Ghana enjoys s status of a core 
member country of the Norwegian Oil for Development program (OfD) within the Norwegian 
Agency for Development Cooperation (Norad) under the auspices of Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs. The cooperation between these two states is meant to transfer knowledge on 
environmental and resource management.  
4.2 Political Overview of Ghana   
Ghana is the first country in the south of the Sahara to have gained independence from the 
British on 6
th
 March 1957. Before then, Ghana (the then gold coast) served as a battle ground 
between the 15
th
 and 20
th
 centuries for several European countries (Portuguese, Dutch, 
Swedes, Danes, Prussians and the British) in their power struggle to secure natural resources. 
The British finally came to stay as the colonial masters of the then gold coast in the middle of 
the 19
th
 century. Ghana was called Gold Coast due to its large and heavy deposits of gold 
resources in the land. This apparently was the cause for the struggle of the numerous 
European countries to gain control over that land. 
A sovereign state with a very strong imperial tradition dating as far back as the 15
th
 century is 
a key characteristic of Ghana at the aftermath of independence. There have been major 
setbacks as a result of intermittent coup d’états sprinkled with civil democratic regimes few 
years into post-independence democratic era. Right after independence of Ghana in 1957 to 
1981, Ghana witnessed not less than eight successive governments of which three were 
civilian and five military rule (Mills et al, 2001). The administration of a Pan-Africanist and a 
leader of a political party (Convention Peoples Party, CPP), Osagyefo Dr. Kwame Nkrumah 
was toppled in a military coup d’état on 24th February, 1966. This was the first of its kind and 
an unfortunate incident in the Ghanaian history and it is alleged to have been sponsored by the 
American’s CIA, according to declassified documents. This again highlights the kind of 
influence the stronger nations have on the local politics of the relatively weak or fragile states 
in Africa. Since then, Ghana’s political story had been a checkered one. After the overthrow 
of the six year rule of Osagyefo Dr. Kwame Nkrumah in 1966, a democratically elected 
government of the Progress Party (PP) led by Dr. Kofi Abrefa Busia was installed in 1969. 
Another coup d’état was witnessed in 1972 which truncated the democratic process again. 
These incidences continued intermittently until the last successful coup d’etart came to stay in 
Dec 1981. Jerry John Rawlings as a military ruler from 1981 changed into a civilian ruler in 
1993.        
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Since December, 1992 Ghana as a state begun to focus uninterruptedly on building stronger 
institutions premised on vibrant democratic values. Since that time there has been smooth 
transitions of power between the two major political parties in Ghana. Jerry John Rawlings 
led National Democratic Congress (NDC) won the 1992 and 1996 general elections. The 
National Democratic Congress lost power after a two successful four year democratic terms of 
office to the strongest opposition party in the 2000 general elections. The New Patriotic Party 
(NPP) led by John Agyekum Kuffour enjoyed a smooth transfer of power from the then 
incumbent NDC government in January 2001. It was from this time that sceptics of the 
strength and the durability of the Ghanaian democracy were proven wrong. The sceptics could 
not have been blamed much because of the historical unfolding that had established more than 
necessary evidence to convince them of how coup d’état were so intermittent in the political 
culture of Ghana. It was until 2008; the end of term of office of John Agyekum Kuffour, that 
the John Evans Atta-Mills led National Democratic Congress again won power from the then 
incumbent New Patriotic Party with a very narrow margin of less than one percent of the total 
valid votes cast in a run-off elections. This to a greater extent brought Ghana to a position to 
catch attention of the world as a model for Africa in terms of democracy. Also Ghana is one 
of the few African countries to have changed from military regime to a civilian one without 
any conflict or bloodshed. These were the words of Barack Obama (the US president) in 
support of this; 
The people of Ghana have worked hard to put democracy on a firmer footing, 
  with peaceful transfers of power even in the wake of closely contested  
 elections. And with improved governance and an emerging civil society (…)3 
    
 A blend of both parliamentary and presidential system of government is what Ghanaians live 
with, in their political lives. Contrary to the presidential system where ministers of state are 
solely appointed out of parliament, and parliamentary system where they are appointed in 
parliament, Ghana’s appointment is done in and out of parliament. But in the case of Ghana 
majority of the ministers must be appointed from parliament. This therefore creates a serious 
link between the executive and the legislative arms of government. 
Ghana shares borders with Burkina Faso to the North, Ivory Coast, Togo and the gulf of 
guinea to the east, west and south respectively. Ghana is located on the west coast of Africa 
                                                     
3
 (http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2009/07/11/obama-ghana-speech-full-t_n_230009.html ) accessed 04/09/12 
46 
 
with a population size of 24,223,431 people (Provisional results of population census Ghana 
Statistical Service, 2010) with 2,500 dollars as per capita income
4
. Out of this population 
women constitute 51 percent (12,421,770) and 49 percent (11,801,661) of men. The people 
are  diversified into about 75 ethnic groups with the Akans forming the majority of 49%, 
Mole- Dagbani 16%, Ewe 13%, Ga-Adangbe 8%, Guan 4% and others 10%. There are over 
70 spoken languages but only nine are officially recognised with English as the official 
language. Its major exporting commodities are Cocoa, timber, Minerals (gold, diamond & 
others) etc and imports include Petroleum, food, Machinery etc. Ghana as a state is 
heterogeneous with occasional tribal and chieftaincy conflicts. Most of the tribal conflicts 
occur in the three poorest regions in the northern part of Ghana. 
Ghana is divided into ten administrative regions with 170 districts out of which 6, 40 and 129 
are metropolitan, municipal and district assemblies respectively. This is an attempt to 
decentralise the government system to the local level in order to facilitate development and 
entrenchment of democracy. This was introduced in 1989 with the passage of the PNDC Law 
207. This was meant to decentralise governance to the local people to improve participatory 
and self governing democracy in Ghana. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                     
4
 (www.indexmundi.com 17/02/12) 
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Source: www.mapsoftworld.com  
Figure 6. The political and administrative map of Ghana  
The political environment of Ghana is severely polarized between the two major political 
parties; NPP and NDC. This arguably, can be classified as an ethnic tension which apparently 
48 
 
can be attributed to the fact that some view the NDC as an Ewe ( or non-akan) party and the 
NPP as largely an Asante or Akan party (Mills et al, 2001). The parliament of Ghana is one of 
the strongest on the African continent whilst the entrenchment of the Ghanaian democracy 
can never be elaborated without mentioning the vibrant nature of the media landscape. The 
repeal of the criminal libel law in 2001 to a less harsh one has mitigated the vulnerability of 
media personnel from extremely harsh law suits.  
4.3 The State and Politics in Ghana  
As a sovereign state Ghana has strong democratic credentials in spite of the ugly political past 
experience. It is still in the process of nation building in terms of infrastructure and 
institutions. The aspirations of Ghanaians are believed to be achieved through institutional 
capabilities under the auspices of democracy. Are these intuitions responding to the 
expectations of the people? Ghanaian institutions are more often than not seen (especially 
those not in government or opposition) as pro government. This tends to affect the trust 
people have in them. However the government also complains about the verdicts (loss of 
cases) of the judicially in recent times. This an indication that some of these institutions are 
gradually weaning themselves off government influence, however there is more room for 
improvement. Stronger or high-quality public institutions are necessary for resource 
management in order to get the maximum value out of natural resource of a state (Humphreys 
et al 2007). With this, incidence of corruption can significantly be minimised. Ghana is not an 
exception to the worst victims of political corruption as a post colonial African state. The 
words of Gyekye (1997) indicate that political corruption causes a serious financial leakage to 
most developing African states which erodes their developmental efforts.            
This to some extent partly explained as result of the colonial legacy. During colonization, 
there was a great difference between the colonized (masses) and the colonizers (the elites). 
Here the few foreign colonial masters who established the political institutions in these states 
recognized themselves as distinct from the ruled. Therefore there was no need to go down low 
to the levels of the ordinary or the ruled except when they needed their assistance. The 
mentality of this master-servant relationship was entrenched during the colonial times because 
the agenda set forth by their pay master was to acquire (rent seeking) wealth but not to build 
states.  
The result of the exploitative activities of the colonial government itself and  
 European firms (especially cocoa buying, banking, shipping, and mining)  
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 was that when the British finally pulled out of Ghana in 1957, they left  
 behind a country which bore all the most important features of  
 underdevelopment. In particular, it suffered from an acute form of  
 structural dislocation. Production and consumption were not integrated  
 within the country but through external trade. (Konadu-Agyemang, 2000). 
 The local people who have taken the places of the colonizers (political positions) refuse to 
come to terms with post-colonial realities. Some still continue to behave like the colonial 
master whose business was not to build the colony state but to seek rent out of the booty of 
the state. This portrays sense of loss of shared responsibilities and patriotism in the nation 
building. This has apparently led to the winner takes all politics; our time has come politics or 
politics of the belly in Ghana. There is general perception in Ghana that politicians are a group 
of (no matter which political party one belongs to) people who get their ways into government 
to enrich themselves at the expense of the ordinary people. This is because the ruled do not 
recognise their interest being addressed to the least of their expectations. But rather, 
politicians’ needs are always addressed with prompt attention. Example is the most talked 
about car loans and accommodations that are quickly made available to members of 
parliament (MP) and ministers of state among other things. Such are some of the incidences 
that bring about occasional political tension in Ghana. In spite of this, there has been a gradual 
erosion of such gap between politicians and the masses. The cause of this situation can be 
attributed to the fear of loss of power after elections organised in every four years.      
Is Ghana’s current political topography ready to meet the expectations from the oil boom that 
has raised hopes of the people? The discovery of petroleum in 2007 has generated a lot of 
excitement about the potential it possesses to bring about a quantum leap in development and 
wealth creation as well reduction in poverty. But if the political structures of a state refuse to 
create a better linkage between them and the people, there looms a great danger ahead of that 
particular nation. Thus dashed aspirations can turn into grievances and consequently 
something undesirable. Previous studies indicate that states that mostly depend on revenue 
from natural resources like oil and gas’ sales tend to be less dependent on the citizens due to 
little or no tax from the citizens which creates a weaker relationship between those 
governments and the people (Karl, 1997). In such instances, the indigenous people who 
endure the cost of extraction and unusually share the benefits are more often than not ignored 
during negotiations. Negotiations are carried on between the political elite and the extremely 
rich oil companies. This therefore ends up in anger generated out of perception of complicity 
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and corruption. There are several events to prove that political frustrations easily emerge in 
countries and communities where production of natural resources occurs (Humphreys et al, 
2007:13)    
4.4 Political Corruption in Ghana? 
Political corruption recurrently raises its head in almost all politically organised human 
institutions; rich or poor, weak or strong, developed or developing, ancient, traditional or 
modern ( Gyekye,1997). It unacceptably suffocates the developmental life of most states 
especially those in Africa who are boastful of possessing most of the assets needed to trigger 
development. Political corruption is not an individual using the wealth of private enterprise to 
enrich him/her self and the cronies. But it is the situation in which one uses public; office, 
resources, fortunes etc to benefit him/herself, family and friends instead of the people, 
community and the state. 
 According to the transparency international’s corruption perception index, Ghana is ranked 
69
th 
(3.9 points) out of 184 countries. This is an indication that there is need to improve 
greatly in order to make sure the revenue from the petroleum resource is secured from the few 
selfish individuals. If more punitive measures are not attached to the already existing laws 
against corruption, it is equally better to let the resource remain in the grounds. This is 
because the perception of corruption has turned into a shocking and outrageous reality as the 
aftermath of the sensational revelations by a renowned investigative journalist, Anas 
Aremeyaw Anas. In his videos telecast on both local and international (Al Jazeera) television 
stations, private and more seriously public officials are observed in complicit acts, (involving 
huge sums of money) which obviously have a terrible impact on the fortunes of the Ghanaian 
state.          
Over the past 100 years the global oil industry has been the most relevant one due to its 
strategic military essence. For this same period it has been the most widely sold commodity in 
the world (Ryggvik, 2010:8). This goes a long way to prove how much cash flow is involved 
in the petroleum production activities. This calls for the need to create unfavourable grounds 
for corruption to flourish at where these FOC operate. As Humphreys, Sachs and Stiglitz 
make it clear in their Escaping the Resource Curse that corruption at high level brings about 
conspicuous political risk that can emerge from natural resource abundance. Thus the 
availability of large financial assets in space of time avails the opportunity for political leader 
to steal from it. 
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When the corrupt opportunities oil and gas production offers to politicians and public officials 
are not reduced to the bear less minimal level, the hope of the ordinary Ghanaian would be 
dashed into a more hopeless and desperate situation. Taking into consideration the graduate 
unemployment rate in Ghana, Collier (2002a) assertion that idle youth can easily be used to 
seek rent (greed and economic opportunism) by few selfish individuals would be confirmed if 
care is not taken. 
4.5 Economic Overview 
Dependency on natural resource is one of the major features of the Ghanaian economy. Prior 
to and after independence it served as a hub of gold, timber and cocoa exports. With per 
capita income of US$170 right after independence classified Ghana as one of the wealthiest 
nations in the tropics. Ghana was ahead of The United Kingdom and Nigeria in terms per 
capita income (Gocking, 2005). Meredith (2005) also points out that Ghana as a newly 
independent state started off very well with independent judiciary, efficient civil service, 
prosperous middle class and outstanding leader; Osagyefo Dr. Kwame Nkrumah. Most of 
Ghana’s physical and social infrastructures were built in the first decade after her 
independent. It as well had 481 million dollars in foreign reserves (US Department of State). 
In spite of the bright start after independence in 1957, it dropped to be one of the 
economically weak states in the world in the late 1970s & 1980s.  Ghana’s economic shocks 
usually emerge out of the fundamental vulnerability to the unstable nature of the prices of its 
major exports (cocoa and gold) coupled with upwards movements of oil and gas prices in the 
international market.  
The economic history of Ghana has been a difficult experience. This apparently can be 
attributed to the successive coup d’états that occurred in its political history especially from 
the mid 1960s to the early 1980s. A consistent economic growth relative to the previous years 
was witnessed in a decade after 1980 and this was apparently due to the stable political 
atmosphere at that time. But over the past two decades, good governance, democratisation 
and, political and economic stability accumulate to contribute to the robust nature of the 
Ghanaian economy in recent times. With the growth rate of 6.6 percent in 2010, the World 
Bank projected the economy of Ghana as the fastest growing economy in sub Saharan Africa 
at the rate of 13.4 percent in 2011( Government of Ghana Official Portal).  Again, Ghana is 
among the few developing countries to have achieved the Millennium Development Goal 
(MDG) of halving poverty by 2015. Ghana has been able to achieve this in advance of the 
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2015 deadline (Asafu-Adjaye, 2009). Though Ghana has recently been declared a middle 
income country, a sizeable amount of the citizens are still poor.  
Ghana has transformed from oil importing state to a net exporter. This has induced serious 
international and domestic financial interest and has subsequently attracted investments from 
foreign oil companies i.e. Tullow Ghana Limited, Kosmos Energy, Anadarko Petroleum 
Corporation, Sabre Oil & Gas Limited and the EO Group.        
4.6 The structure of the Ghanaian Economy 
Agriculture, Industry and Service are the major sectors of the Ghanaian economy according to 
Ghana statistical Service (GSS). Until very recently the agriculture sector paved way for the 
service sector to assume a leading role in economic development in terms of contribution to 
GDP (Asafo-Adjaye, 2009). Relatively, Ghana’s industrial sector is developed with respect to 
other African states. However there is space for value addition to its agricultural products and 
other raw materials. Industry accounts for about 18.6 percent whilst agriculture and service 
sectors contribute 29.9 and 51.4 percent to GDP respectively (GSS, 2010). 
The major source of foreign exchange in Ghana is the exportation of cocoa and gold as well 
as the remittances from nationals abroad. The fall of commodity especially cocoa and gold 
prices coupled with the upwards movement of oil and gas prices in the international market 
and the fear of oncoming elections by the then ruling party (NDC) in the year 2000, 
apparently incapacitated the government to take realistic prudent economic measures.   
This probably led to the rise in inflation to 40.5 percent with growth rate of GDP at 3.7 
percent. After the elections in 2000, the Ghanaian economy was resuscitated with 6.3 percent 
growth rate of GDP and 10 percent rate of inflation by the year 2007. Currently, Ghana is 
enjoying an impressive economic performance with a growth rate of 7.1 percent (GSS press 
release in Sept.2012). This coupled with the democratization have made Ghana gained 
recognition in the international community as one of promising African states. Due to this 
Ghana is now a core member state of the Norwegian Oil for Development Programme. 
4.7 The Ghanaian Gold Experience  
It is important to bring to fore the experience Ghana has had with production of gold due to 
some of the similarities it shares with petroleum resource. Some of the commonalities are; 
both are natural resources, non-renewable, high technological know-how is required to exploit 
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etc. The tradition of gold mining in Ghana had been in existence centuries before 
independence. But the question I try to answer breifly is how have Ghanaians benefited from 
their gold?  Despite Ghana having a long tradition of gold mining, its mining laws are more 
favourable to the multinational companies than the host country.  
“An Important characteristic of mining and mineral law in Ghana is the clear protection of 
the interest of multinational mining companies whilst the protection of community right and 
the environment is fluid” Owusu-Koranteng (2005). 
The benefits outlined by the PNDC Law 153 of 1986 (the mining investment law) to investors 
are generously enormous with the reason being the attraction of massive foreign direct 
investment to the sector. The law only requires the companies to only pay compensations to 
the indigenous people whose lands are being acquired for the mining. The mode of payment 
of the compensation is based on a commonly used formula of the headcount method of crops 
destroyed multiply by a historically fixed government rates for various crops in an 
inflationary economy. This means the actual land is virtually taken for free and this denies 
most farming communities farmland to feed on after taking such meagre compensation from 
the foreign companies. Apart from such compensations, the PNDC Law 153 pegged the 
government’s entitlement at 10 percent (previously 55 per cent) and other revenues generated 
from this sector are basically royalties and taxes which are also relaxed as a result of 
government intention to attract investors to the sector. In order to reduce governmental 
control to increase privatisation some strategic policies were put in place with the help of the 
World Bank through SAP.  
 “During the early 1990s, World Bank monies were used to establish the Small-Scale Mining 
Project (SSMP), which delegated industry responsibilities to the Geological Survey 
Department, Minerals Commission, Precious Minerals and Marketing Corporation (PMMC), 
and Mines Department” Hilson and Potter (2005) 
This apparently is the reason why after a long history of massive exploitation of gold resource 
a significant number of Ghanaians still live with poverty. This scenario gives the impression 
that the petroleum resource may follow trend of gold production in Ghana. There has been 
skepticism across board as to how the petroleum resource will affect the Ghanaian economy 
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as the then vice president of Ghana indicated in august, 2011 that “the future of this country is 
not in gold, it’s not in oil; the future of this country is in agriculture,”5            
 
4.7 Conclusion 
Ghana has been politically stable country at least for the past two decades in spite of the 
difficult past. Natural resources exploitation is never new to Ghana as it has been mining 
minerals like god, diamonds, bauxite and manganese. But these have not had any significant 
impact on the citizens and this apparently due to the time of discovery.          
But with the petroleum discovery, unlike most of the states in the south which discovered 
their petroleum resources during colonization or just after independence. Ghana has taken the 
time to mature in terms of managing its socio-economic and political affairs. This discovery 
has come no better time than before but could have been best at a later time than this. 
Relatively Ghana has a society and institutions which are in a better position to bring to fore 
transparency and accountability in the new petroleum industry. The mostly strong parliament 
and judiciary, stronger media and a very active civil society give Ghana high level of hope in 
making sure the petroleum resource becomes a benefit but not a deficit. Pressure groups like 
Alliance for Accountable Government (AFAG) and Committee for Joint Action (CJA) have 
been playing very useful roles in various capacities to entrench transparency and 
accountability in the Ghanaian political scene. However, corruption has been an albatross on 
the neck of the economic progress of Ghana which also threatens the very potential of this 
petroleum resource. It is feared that corruption and other factors like the lack of technological 
know-how may rob Ghanaians of the benefits of the oil and gas. It is in this respect that 
Ghanaians look up to the Norwegian oil management style to save themselves from the burst 
capable of emerging out of the boom.                
 
 
 
                                                     
5
 (http://business.myjoyonline.com/pages/news/201109/73501.php. Agriculture holds Ghana’s future, not gold, 
not oil – Veep) Accessed 10/11/’12.  
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Chapter Five 
The Norwegian Oil for Development in Ghana. 
 
5.1 Norwegian Oil for Development in Ghana 
The Oil for Development (OfD) program is a Norwegian government means of providing 
assistance in petroleum revenue and environmental management to developing countries that 
have discovered petroleum resource. Examples of such countries are; Angola, Bolivia, Ghana, 
Mozambique, Nigeria, Sudan, Timor-Leste and Uganda as the core countries of the 
Norwegian Oil for Development. Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Cambodia, Ecuador, Iraq, Côte 
d’Ivoire, Kenya, Lebanon, Mauritius, Nicaragua, the Palestinian Territory, São Tomé and 
Príncipe, South Africa, Tanzania, Vietnam and Zambia serve as countries with limited 
cooperation.  
Ghana now enjoys a core member status with the Oil for Development program with the focus 
on resource and environmental management (Norad, 2010).  These co operations between 
Norway and the other states are being conducted through the Oil for Development (OfD) 
program under the supervision of the Norwegian Agency for Development Cooperation 
(NORAD) which also falls under the Ministry Foreign Affairs. This chapter aims to consider 
how effective the transfer of petro knowledge has been in the Ghanaian context. Thus the 
chapter questions to what extent the OfD program helps Ghana to appropriately respond to the 
resource curse threat? In doing this, I also compare and contrast relevant variables (like 
Population, volumes, laws, political systems, location etc) that have been identified in the 
earlier chapters as having effect on the success or otherwise of petroleum resource 
management. 
5.2 Oil for Development 
Oil for Development (OfD) was initiated in 2005 to assist countries endowed with petroleum 
resources to manage them in an economically, environmentally and socially responsible 
manner to also guarantee the needs of the future generation. That’s to help manage petroleum 
resource to bring about positive change to the citizens by reducing poverty to cause 
improvement in the quality of lives of the populace. This assistance from Norway to the other 
countries is usually granted based upon request to the Norwegian government i.e. demand 
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driven. This OfD aid program is also meant to entrench the long standing history of the 
provision of assistance in petroleum related activities by the Norwegian government since the 
1980s. Though good governance is not the only criterion for granting such request, it is cross 
cutting benchmark in all of the OfD activities. The principles of good governance entail 
transparency, anti-corruption and accountability (Norad, 2010). It is believed that through 
these, petroleum resources can be translated into welfare of the society. This is because many 
states struggle to translate petroleum resource into welfare of the people. Therefore the oil for 
development program serves as a Norwegian response to the resource curse. 
The Ghana National Petroleum Cooperation (GNPC) in October, 2007 applied for assistance 
on behalf of the government from the Norwegian Oil for Development Program. This was not 
long after the discovery in June, 2007 in order to ensure that the petroleum resource becomes 
a blessing but not a curse. As the then president (John Agyekum Kuffour) of the republic of 
Ghana in 2007 stated when a delegation (oil industry experts from Norway) led by Mr. Tore 
Nedred (the ambassador to Ghana) called on him at the Osu casttle, that the country was ready 
to co-operate with and to benefit from Norway's acclaimed expertise in the sector
6
. This 
cooperation between Ghana and Norway’s OfD program was officially recognized after a 
memorandum of understanding (MoU) was sign in February, 2008 (Norad, 2010). The 
agreement was focused on assistance in resource and environmental management. The major 
cooperating institutions in Ghana are Ministry of Energy, Ministry of Environment, Science 
and Technology, Ghana National Petroleum Corporation (GNPC), Environmental Protection 
Agency and Town and country Planning (Norad, 2010).With this, Ghana is to receive 
assistance in petroleum policy and master plan formulation as well as technical assistance in 
the evaluation of the development of the oil (jubilee) fields. Again Norway has assisted Ghana 
in drafting the new petroleum (exploration and Production) Bill as well as the Petroleum 
Commission Bill.  In this context attention is given to institutional strengthening premised on 
good governance. “A two year development program within petroleum management and 
technical training were initiated by Petrad comprising resource and environment, as well as 
other sectors and government institutions” (Norad, 2010 p:25) 
                                                     
6
Myjoyonline.com (Ghana ready to learn from Norway’s experience in oil management,                            
www.business.myjoyonline.com/pages/news/200711/10174.php  accessed 05/12/12)    
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It is an institutional cooperation and that is really a government to  
 government institutions and when it comes to petroleum, we ( i.e. Norway)  
 of course work with your( i.e. Ghana) ministry of energy, ministry of  
 environment… and ministry of finance but the emphasis is on energy and 
 environment ministries……..,   
The institutions involved in the petroleum sector in Ghana, they are several  
 but they are described in the new petroleum laws and that’s being an  
 important activity which we  (i.e. Norway) have assisted you (i.e. Ghana)  
 on is formulating the new laws. So that’s how Norway’s petroleum  
 governance experience has transferred a bit to Ghana. That is through   
 new law making. (Interview with Svein Heglund, OfD officer in charge   
 of Angola, Ghana and West Africa. 29/02/2012) 
In 2010 the Ghanaian government received 15.6 million NOK (2,641,000 US Dollar 
equivalent), compared to 8.3 million NOK (1,405,190 US Dollar equivalent) 2009 in the form 
of aid through the Norwegian Oil for Development (OfD) aid program (Norad, 2010). This 
was meant to sponsor Norwegian personnel with petroleum expertise to Ghana to give advice 
and direction with respect to petroleum related activities. Again workshops and seminars are 
as well organized for officials from Ghana. Examples are; delegation from ministry of energy 
and GNPC visiting Norway during the offshore Northern Sea conference in Stavanger and 
again, personnel from GNPC participated in Petrad’s eight –week training program on 
Petroleum Development and Operation and Petroleum Policy and Resource Management in 
Stavanger. This is how the Norwegian development aid program is organized for the 
Ghanaian institutions in order to give them the technical knowhow when formulating laws 
and policies relative to the petroleum sector. The OfD under Norwegian Agency for 
Development Cooperation (Norad) only coordinates the activities of the Norwegian 
institutions in Ghana. The Cooperation between Norway and Ghana does not involve transfer 
of money from the Norwegian government to the Ghanaian institutions. 
We (OfD under Norad) are only the coordinator. We have the money so we  
 coordinate the activities. Most of the money is in fact used by Norwegian  
 institutions to put aside people and time to assist Ghana. Example NPD   
 has people working in Ghana and giving advice to your (Ghana) ministry.  
 This is part of the overall agreement between Norway and Ghana. We OfD  
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 coordinate and reimburse Norwegian institutions. So the cooperation here is  
 we (OfD) are not sending money to Ghana. Ghana pays for their own  
 institutions but we pay for our institutions to go down to Ghana and give  
 advice in principle. So it is not so much money it’s much more giving the  
 Ghanaian institutions advice. Like a person in your ministry of energy can  
 phone up a colleague in the Norwegian ministry and get advice. It is very  
 direct, very qualified and very special type of advice. (Interview with Svein  
 Heglund, OfD 29/02/2012). 
 The Norwegian government in her attempt to assist developing countries who are rich in 
petroleum resources. But it doesn’t want to impose decisions on the receiving countries due 
the peculiarity and dynamics of the environments in question, therefore it only advises. 
However, achieving poverty reduction through the use of petroleum resources is the primary 
objective of the Oil for Development Program. This is the Norwegian response to the resource 
curse and it is premised on governance and democracy building. 
5.3 Is the OfD an Antidote to the Resource Curse threat in Ghana? 
The OfD program aims at achieving technical capacity-building maximize government 
revenues from oil and clarifying roles in the state apparatus to contribute to a balance of 
power between the state and the oil industry (Solli, 2011). It is hoped that when these are 
achieved in a producing state, oil can easily be translated into the welfare of the people. 
Several scholars (Ross, Collier, Humphrey et al, etc) - are of the view that stronger 
institutions and acceptance of democratic means of governance is the way to go when it 
comes to sound resource management. This apparently forms the basis of the Norwegian oil 
for development program to have used good governance as the key criterion for granting such 
kind of assistance to countries with the quest to making petroleum resource a blessing but not 
a curse. It is for a fact that clarity of roles of stronger institutions and democracy are able to 
significantly help reduce the severity of the “so called” threat of the natural resource 
becoming a curse. This is because democratic means of governance make the political elite 
accountable to the masses or reduces the dichotomy between the political elites and the 
society. This increases the demand for accountability by the citizenry from the political 
aristocrats. Therefore with this, the resources (thus rent from the natural resources) will be 
channeled through the proper means to address the needs of the people.  
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Again, when this is coupled with stronger institutions, there will little room for unnecessary 
political interference in the functions of the institutions. Because institutional roles will be 
clearly defined and this gives them the capacity to execute identified task in bringing 
improvement to the lives of the ordinary people. As Humphrey et al, 2007(p. 23) explains the 
need for institutional strengthening before the commencement of any extractive activity 
concerning natural resources. It is believed that when such measures are put in place, it will 
have a trickledown effect on the capacity building in the state apparatus focused on reducing 
poverty. This is how the Norwegian OfD program helps to bring to bear the relevance of the 
resources to the citizens of the producing states like.  
In spite of Ghana being one of the strongest democracies in Africa, this doesn’t necessarily 
mean it can automatically avoid the possible burst of the boom of the petroleum resource. It is 
true that good governance and stronger institutions can hugely contribute to the role of natural 
resources in poverty alleviation, but that is only one (domestic) side of the argument for the 
resource governance. The issue of good governance with the Norwegian Oil for development 
is vague, because it is a kind of normative or prescriptive means of political governance 
premised on western beliefs in a vacuum of scientific reasoning based on culture, history and 
other domestic factors in the settings of recipient states. In other words, state formation or 
nation building ought not to be an objective but subjective understanding of people a in terms 
of cultural, history, economic, tradition etc experience. 
Resource governance is a duality of domestic and international political interactions because 
producing countries lack the capacity to self exploit which calls for profit maximizing 
oriented foreign agencies; with the later being a major source of worry and often lacks the 
attention it deserves. McNeish et al (2012, p.24) explains how exploitation of natural 
resources exposes the overlapping nature of formal and informal geopolitical sovereignties. 
When the former is unable to effectively counter the impact of the later, the rent from such 
natural resources is usually distributed not in favour of the rightful owner. Clarke (2008) also 
argues that natural resources ( especially oil and gas) have made Africa a competitive power 
between great powers, mid-range states, African polities and corporate oil- involving the 
interest of global, regional and local players. And this situation often robs off the resource 
producing countries in this particular region the very benefits (rent) of such gift of nature.  
Adam Smith elaborates, the theory of rent as the price the landlord charges the tenant after 
taking into account expenditure together with the ordinary profit on the use of a piece of land 
( resource exploitation in this context). Whatever above the expenditure and average profit, is 
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the rent that must naturally go to the owner of the land (producing state). But more often than 
not, liberalism and ignorance on the part of the landlord usually make him accept anything 
less than the actual rent. That is, natural resource owners (i.e. states) are frequently ignorant 
about of their right to fully benefit from these gifts of nature by making sure invertors only 
benefit from the average rate of profit. The rent is what belongs to the people and must be 
controlled only by those people. This is what Norway made sure to do by securing the extra 
income beyond the average rate of profit, because it owns or control this particular resource 
(petroleum).  
Norway was just like any other country in the south of the globe; with neither capital nor the 
technological know-how to exploit its petroleum resource in the initial stages of its oil and gas 
industry. However, as described above it also made sure to use foreign interest without losing 
control over its priorities (development). Stronger protectionist strategies by the then 
Norwegian government hugely accounts for their success in petroleum management. That is 
foreign companies were threatened to be punished in later concession round if they refuse to 
in increase the shares of the Norwegian contractors (Ryggvik, 2010). Currently Norway has 
oil related companies (Statoil, Aker Solutions etc) seeking contracts, license and concessions 
around the globe. “Thus Norway now has an economy whose main actors have the same 
underlying interests as those companies which early Norwegian oil policy aimed to protect the 
country from” (Ryggvik, 2010). In this sense how does the OfD program assists petroleum 
producing states like Ghana to secure such rent which is highly contestable between the 
producing states and other external actors (corporate oil, great powers and other states alike)?   
The general perception about the Norwegian model is that it can be imported into countries 
which also have oil in commercial quantities. Because the resources curse literature and OfD 
isolate Norway as one of the few success stories in petroleum resource management. And it 
does not layout a specific way to go when it comes to resource governance but for good 
governance. However, it accepts the fact that it is extremely difficult to replicate the 
Norwegian experience or model in any other environment in the current global politico-
economic dispensation. Svein Hugland; OfD officer in charge of Ghana, acknowledges that 
the Norwegian petroleum experience is not always relevant due to dynamics and peculiarity 
of time and space. The condition in which Norway started off is quite distinct from how and 
where most developing African countries like Ghana is starting from. Therefore it is 
important not to lose sight of the differences in the environmental and developmental context 
Norway and Ghana found and find themselves respectively. 
61 
 
5.6 Contextualizing the Norwegian Experience in Ghana 
It is important to note that Ghana and Norway are two very distinct countries. These 
differences are historical, political, economic, cultural and many others.  All these come 
together to give every state a unique experience in its body politics. As a result of this, caution 
needs to take central position whenever a success track of a particular country deserve to be 
replayed by another state. Norway as a country had a long tradition of industrial activities 
before the discovery of oil and gas and this played a very crucial role in making sure it regain 
dominance and control over it petroleum activities. Due to the Norwegian past industrial 
experience (In ship building) prior to the discovery it did not struggle much to convert some 
of its expertise to the sectors that were relevant to the then new petroleum industry. The 
Ghanaian industrial history is not as relevant even if there is one to quickly support the new 
petroleum industry. Therefore the time and effort Norwegian industries used to organize 
themselves to actively get involved in the petroleum activities can hardly be the same as what 
Ghana will need if it wants to have similar local industries.  
Again, the structure of the global political and economic architecture in 1971 is different from 
2012. Some policies that were legal then in terms of international trade are illegal now. The 
globalization and liberalization of international trade have given sovereign states (especially 
the developing ones) less autonomy in taking critical measures which various economic 
theories advocate in favour of industrialization and development. The introduction of free 
trade by the WTO and other international organizations among nations has further curtailed 
the industrialization progress of most developing countries by making them net exporters of 
raw materials. Economic histories of the developed world indicate the need for governments 
to protect local industries with tariffs and other measures in order to promote the growth of 
local industries. Most of such measures have become unacceptable in the current international 
trade system. 
 The Norwegian ambition to establish total national control did not come to stay without 
clashing with interest of the foreign oil companies. In such cases the countries of origin of the 
oil companies are usually in support of them for strategic reasons. This makes it extremely 
difficult for countries which are dependent on these super powers to go against their will and 
interest of the great power countries in order to do what is in the interest of the producing 
societies. A good example is; Ghana’s attempt to review the contract between her and 
Kosmos Oil (An American Oil Company) and others was linked to the incident of visa 
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refusals of the Ghanaian government officials including the GNPC boss and the minister of 
energy for no reason by the US embassy in Accra
7
. This action of the Ghanaian government 
was believed not to have been in the interest of US government and consequently attracted 
their anger. These kinds of bilateral and multilateral agreements between states and other 
bodies and the flexing of diplomatic muscles are what usually deny the developing countries 
like Ghana the opportunity to fully benefit from their petroleum resources.  
Is Ghana likely to go contrary to Norway’s initial style of moderate pace of extraction? The 
desire to reduce poverty, increase infrastructure stocks, create employment opportunities etc 
by politicians is at its peak and these require huge capital investment. As it stands now, 
government of Ghana is heavily relying on foreign loans especially from China and other 
western countries as well the world bank and IMF (e.g. the famous 6 billion us dollar Chinese 
loan) to embark on most of these projects. Logically the windfall from the oil boom is 
obviously needed. This is why concerns have been raised if Ghana can adopt a moderate pace 
of extraction to allow it some to time to acquire locally the technological know-how to 
embark on the exploitation on its own. The “resource curse” thesis indicates that resource 
boom often leads to extravagant or profligate (out of over exuberance) spending by 
government as a result of unnecessary optimism from those windfalls. This is what the theory 
of the behavouralists suggests i.e.  Natural resource –abundance often leads to irrational or 
emotional bahaviour on the part of the political elites. Looking at the various campaign 
promises across the political divide in 2012, there is the strong indication that the revenue 
from the petroleum resource is a major source of hope for the politicians in Ghana. With this, 
is Ghana likely to resist the temptation of quick extraction in order to raise revenue to embark 
on the political ambitions of the Ghanaian politicians? 
The resource curse thesis elaborates, booms from natural resources tends to create a 
dichotomy between the state and the society. Because the political elites do not require the 
will or support of the citizenry to run the affairs of the nation since incomes accrued from 
such windfalls substitutes or reduces their dependency on the tax regimes and this 
consequently reduces the demand for accountability by the populace. On the contrary is the 
Norwegian experience. Politics was already a social game in the body politics of the 
Norwegian people prior to the petroleum discovery. Political activism was extremely high just 
                                                     
7
 (www.modernghana.com http://www.modernghana.com/news/275610/1600/us-shows-its-neocolonial-fist-in-
ghana.html Accessed 18/07/2012) 
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before and the genesis of the petroleum industry. This made most of the petroleum activities 
and policies public issues and transparent right from the start. Though Ghana is with a society 
which is relatively well awake with respect to politics but The Ghanaian situation is relatively 
not that positive when it comes to political activities since it is primary based on partisan 
instead of nationalistic lines.  
However Ghana is a multiparty democratic state with several civil organizations (NGOs, 
Pressure groups, Associations etc) that are very active. Furthermore its media is one of the 
strongest in Africa. The freedom of the press is what gives hope by going the extent of 
exposing some of the corrupt and complicit activities of public officials. This serves as a 
serious check on both politicians and public officials. These coupled with the every four year 
term elections bring on board high level of demand for accountability. But as to what degree 
this demand can reduce corruption in the Ghanaian petroleum industry can hardly be 
determined for now. Because some activities which amount to corruption is almost accepted 
in the social norms of the Ghanaian political culture. Bribery in diversified forms has become 
very common to extent that it ceases to warrant attention anymore. Incidence and perception 
in corruption in Ghana is relatively high whilst Norway is still yet to discover a corrupt 
practice in its oil industry. 
5.7 Conclusion 
The Oil for Development program is making necessary contributions to the Ghanaian 
petroleum industry in terms of capacity building, law making as well as advising the 
government on petroleum related issues. These in addition to Ghana’s democratic credentials 
(the free press, free and fair elections, politically awake civil society etc) indicate a positive 
direction in favour of the Ghanaian petroleum management, because most resource curse 
literatures suggest that lack of democracy, transparency, accountability, stronger institutions 
etc are the causes of the poor economic performance. All these converge to explain how best 
the rent from the resources can be put into judicious use to benefit all and sundry.  
But then and again, the issue is not only how to domestically manage the rent in a better way 
but also how states can secure the maximum rent is what the resource literatures refuse to 
elaborate. In my opinion, the oil for development program offers more of endogenous 
solutions but little of the exogenous ones. Though the extractive business is interplay of 
domestic and foreign interests but curtailing the domestic interest overrides that of the foreign 
in the solutions offered by the OfD program. That is less attention is given to how these rich 
64 
 
but underdeveloped and apparently weak states can counter balance of the profit maximizing 
interest of the foreign oil companies who always enjoy the unflinching support of their 
powerful countries of origin. This is where observers become skeptical of the Norwegian oil 
for development program (OfD) in Ghana. Looking at the Norwegian economy whose main 
actors are oil related companies seeking licenses around the world and this brings to bear is a 
conflict of interest between the national interest of the Norwegian government and the OfD 
program. This indicates that the OfD serves as a “Trojan horse” for the profit oriented 
Norwegian oil companies to get the chance to operate in the recipient states. However it is in 
the prerogative of the recipient state like Ghana to cautiously pick the important lessons that 
can be drawn from the experience of Norway. In this respect, the Norwegian petroleum 
experience offers a lot of lessons per the findings and analysis of this research.  
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Chapter Six 
Findings and Discussion 
6.0 Findings and Discussion 
On the basis of the qualitative criteria highlighted in preceding chapter, this chapter seeks to 
consider the value and impact of the Norwegian Oil for Development Program, and 
Norwegian oil experience in general, in relation to the current efforts to develop an oil 
industry in Ghana. Qualitative method is usually premised on subject matter of social sciences 
(that is people and their social world) but not subject matter of the natural sciences that can be 
interpreted in an objective manner (Bryman, 2008). Thus qualitative unlike quantitative 
research is usually not free from the subjective interpretation of the people under study and 
the researcher. To reduce the effect of the subjectivity of the interpretation in order to 
facilitate understanding, the findings will be presented in a descriptive manner for it to speak 
for itself.  
After the presentation of each finding, the other phase will subject the finding to an analytical 
interpretation whilst comparing the literature with the findings to indentify key factors and 
relationships. This will further expand and extend the data beyond the descriptive phase and 
contribute to the meanings of the findings to the topic of this study.  
The final phase will be dedicated to evaluation of the findings by looking at Ghana through 
the lens of Norwegian hydrocarbons management style to identify points of convergence and 
divergence with the means of comparative study. This is to facilitate understanding of 
similarities and differences or get a deeper understanding of the Norwegian petroleum 
experience in the Ghanaian context. In doing this, how institutions, the political history and 
environment, traditions and customs of Norway have contributed to the development of its oil 
industry and how these can be helpful to Ghanaian hydrocarbon industry is considered. This is 
done through purposive sampling where relevant respondents to the research questions and 
goals are sampled. Moreover, a variety of respondents were sampled from the Oil for 
Development Program, Norwegian Petroleum Directorate, Norwegian Petroleum Museum 
and Technology, Innovation and Culture of University of Oslo and analysis of secondary data 
like articles, journals, books etc are utilized in the analysis and arguments due to their 
relevance to the research questions posed.         
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As chapter two explains in detail, countries endowed with natural resource can hardly be 
disassociated from poverty, diseases, corruption, political instabilities, dictatorships, poor 
infrastructure etc. Examples are; Sierra Leone’s Blood Diamond, Angolan oil and diamond; 
civil war and corruption, Nigeria a major oil exporter; high rate of poverty and corruption, 
Sudan’s oil and conflict, DR Congo’s minerals; corruption and civil war etc. These are the 
reasons for Ghana’s motivation to co-operate with and to benefit from Norway’s acclaimed 
expertise in the hydrocarbons industry. In this sense I critically compare and contrast these 
two countries to find out how Ghana can benefit from the Norwegian oil experience to avoid 
pitfalls.    
6.1 Differences and Similarities between Ghana and Norway in the 
framework of Petro- Governance 
The current phenomenon of global trade liberalization tied with treaties, convention, 
ratifications and agreements necessitates the need to duel on historical and present events in a 
contextual framework with respect to policy direction. This is why the differences and 
similarities between Ghana and Norway with reference to factors that have influence on 
petroleum resources and development must be brought to bear. The table below compares 
Norway in 1971 and Ghana 2012.    
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
67 
 
Figure 4 
 Norway (1971)  Ghana (2012) 
Political System Parliamentary/ Monarchical  Presidential 
System of Government  Social/Welfare ( Democracy) Mixed (Democracy) 
Political Concept Unitary/Centralized  (Not 
Federal) 
Unitary/Centralized (Not 
Federal) 
Tempo of Extraction Moderate Desired 
Dependency Rate Moderate High hopes 
Discovery Location Offshore Offshore 
Mode of Licensing  Several Licenses  Several Licenses 
National Control 1
st
 Priority Desired 
Protectionism Very High Desired 
Population 3,877,000 24,223,431  
Volumes of production (P/d) 40,000 b/pd (Ekofisk 1974) 63,000 b/pd (Jubilee Field) 
Ethnicity Heterogeneous  Heterogeneous  
Technology Desired (Imported) Desired ( Importing)  
 
Figure 7 Differences and Similarities between Ghana and Norway. 
The poor economic performance of most of the petroleum producing states is induced by 
multiplicity of factors, the most central of which are mentioned in the table above. These 
variables are mentioned in reference to how they can contribute to the poor economic 
performance in one way or the other. As already elaborated in chapter two, such variables 
mentioned in the table above are analyzed and examined by comparing and contrasting Ghana 
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and Norway to find out how such variables have had no negative influence on Norway to 
serve as lessons to Ghana.  
Ethnicity: Observers agree that conflicts easily originate mostly, whenever a group of people 
with a common identity out of a heterogeneous society feel neglected in the distribution of the 
wealth from natural resources of a state. However this is contingent upon the lines of division 
or negligence among the economic classes of the state. Thus when a particular group of 
people of the nation find themselves only in the lower economic class and feel neglected in 
the distribution of the resource wealth of the state, they are easily motivated by creed ( 
identity) to fight for their portion of the bounty of nature. But on the contrary when the 
society is homogeneous, it is unlikely for such a conflict to occur.  
In this respect both Ghana and Norway are heterogeneous in their ethnic composition. So 
what lessons are there for Ghana to learn from Norway in these directions? Norway was not 
without ethnic (communal) tensions as to who ought to fully benefit from the oil production in 
the early stages of production. These tensions were manifested when it came to the struggle 
for the oil capital city of Norway. “Stavanger’s the place” was the slogan of the city council 
during the debate for the location of Statoil and Norwegian Petroleum Directorate offices. The 
efforts of Mayor Arne Rettedal coupled with Kjølv Egeland (Head of Rogaland Regional 
College in Stavanger) and the city treasurer, Konrad B Knudsen were driving forces for the 
parliamentary decision to establish Statoil and NPD in Stavanger on 14
th
 June, 1972 ( 
Norwegian Petroleum Museum, 2000).  
In spite of the tension among communities (ethnic) for the oil capital, these struggles were 
calmly settled by the parliament due to generally accepted democratic rule the people of 
Norway had chosen to go by. Similar kinds of tensions occasionally occur though not about 
the location of the oil capital but rather how revenue from the oil produce is distributed with 
emphasis on the coastal community along which the oil is produced in Ghana. The people of 
the western region of Ghana believe they deserve to get a special share (10%) of the revenue 
from the oil boom due to the fact that the oil is found in that region. Since Ghana is relatively 
new in petroleum production with strong democratic credentials (stronger parliament) it is 
possible to prevent such tension to degenerate into conflict, as parliament (representation of 
the people) of Ghana can deliberate to find what is in the national interest. 
Political system: The political system (presidential or parliamentary) of a state can play a role 
in the success or otherwise of the resource management of the state. A purely presidential 
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system of government without a strong parliament to serve as check on the executive arm of 
government is more likely to fail in its resource governance. Parliament is the key institution 
that checks on the activities of the executives. The absence of stronger parliament in a 
presidential system of government gives the executive the free hand to operate with little or 
no demand for accountability which usually leads to corruption. And this is likely to create a 
gap between the state apparatus and the society due to the windfall from the oil production.  
Norway and Ghana slightly differ in this sense. Norway and Ghana basically practice 
parliamentary and presidential system of governance respectively. With parliamentary system 
of government all major decisions are made by the representation of the populace which 
renders transparency higher than in the presidential system. This apparently is one of the 
reasons why transparency was high in the Norwegian oil governance right from the start. All 
major political decisions are taken by the executive (cabinet which is headed by the president) 
subject to the approval of parliament in the presidential system of Ghana. Due to this the 
people of Ghana are hope of transparency and high demand for accountability because of the 
independent nature of the parliament of Ghana. The parliament of Ghana is relatively stronger 
with respect to demand for accountability and transparency since the inception of democratic 
rule in 1992. Because of the strong nature of the parliament of Ghana, the difference between 
the two countries is insignificant in the sense of accountability and transparency. However it 
is a routine in Ghana that partisan interest mostly overrides national interest, as it is normally 
expressed in the Ghanaian political debates that “the minority will have their say and majority 
will have their way”. Also it is highly uncommon for an MP to oppose or criticize a stance 
taken by his/her party in a parliamentary debate. With this, it is possibly easier for the strong 
multinational oil companies to manipulate the situation to their advantage. The sales of Ghana 
Telecom to Vodafone UK is a typical example when an MP (Mr. P.C. Appiah-Ofori) from the 
then majority side of parliament alleged that his colleagues were bribed with 5000 US dollars 
each for the parliamentary approval of the sales of which most Ghanaians were against.
8
           
Political Concepts: Again, federalism as concept of governance together with over 
dependence on natural resource by the state poses a major challenge when it comes to 
resource (oil and gas) governance especially in the developing world. When revenue 
generated from these resources serve as the main stay of the federal government of a country, 
it creates a sense of competition for the revenue from the resource between the state/region 
                                                     
8 (http://www.modernghana.com/news/366775/1/african-democracies-are-indeed-tragic-corruption-x.html)  
70 
 
and the federal government/republic in the body politics of that nation. And this usually 
serves as breeding grounds for grievance of the local communities which ends up 
degenerating into all sorts of conflicts. A look at Norway and Ghana in terms of federalism 
presents a condition immune from the challenges from this concept of governance.  
Location of discovery: Furthermore, the proximity (location) of the resource also plays a 
crucial role in either contributing to resource curse (conflict) or otherwise. When the location 
of the resource in question makes it easier for it to be accessed, there can be higher incentive 
for few powerful individuals to organize people and try to take advantage of the location and 
capture their portion of the booty to either enrich themselves or finance their conflict 
agendum. Since Ghana also has deep sea drilling just as Norway, it is less probable for such 
an incident to happen. This is because accessing the resource in these locations requires high 
level of technological knowhow and huge investment cost, so it did not take Norway any 
special efforts to prevent people with interest to get easy access even if there were any.  
Dependency Rate: Due to the volatility of the world market prices of natural resources, 
countries that rely heavily on the incomes from the sales of natural resources risk the chance 
of getting a reliable and consistence source of income. And this is likely to lead to poor 
economic performance when there is an unexpected drop in prices. 
As a result of this, Norway was mindful of how large the new oil industry would become in 
order not to crowd out the other sector of the sectors of the economy (Kristiansen Øystein of 
NPD). This is why they resorted to moderate rate of extraction for at least the first two 
decades. This was meant to restrict the oil industry from over expanding to strangulate the 
other sectors like the manufacturing, agriculture and the fishing industry. The moderate pace 
of extraction allowed Norway to put measures in place to reduce or prevent the factor 
movement, spending effect and spill-over effects, which cause the Dutch disease as already 
explained above in chapter three. Because of this other industries like fishing and 
manufacturing and agriculture were safeguarded to provide jobs and income before the oil 
industry will also grow and compliment the other sector to the economic development of the 
state. 
Ghana in this respect has an economy which is diversified (financial & insurance, commerce, 
agriculture etc) to stand the temptation of relying heavily only the petroleum resource. But the 
issue is how to make sure the petroleum sector does come to suffocate sectors like the cocoa 
industry which is a very important sector in Ghana. Since the petroleum industry is still 
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young, there is yet to be known economic measures that have been put in place to protect the 
already existing sectors.     
Rate of Extraction: More often than not, endowed states initially lack the technical know-
how to start exploitation on their own. Again the majority of the population at the time of 
discovery usually have little or no idea of exploitation business of the resource in question, so 
if time is not taken (i.e. slow pace of extraction) for the public to get grips of what is 
happening, only a few will take advantage of the situation because of little demand for 
accountability. If time is not taken for the state to adapt to the demands of the resources 
(especially if it is nonrenewable), it would be exhausted before the state gets the competent 
generation to handle the demands of those resources in making sure the state actually benefits 
from it. 
Also, quick extraction pace is likely to generate too much income in the system which is 
capable of overheating the respective economy to a level it cannot tolerate. This subsequently 
leads to appreciation of real exchange and consequently Dutch disease. Apparently, these are 
the reasons why Norway opted for moderate rate of extraction for the first two decades which 
helped them to acquire the technological knowhow before increasing their pace of extraction.  
For now, it is a desire for Ghanaians to toe the line of moderate rate of extraction since this 
industry is quiet a young one (first oil drilled in 2009). This makes it difficult to determine 
how (moderate or quick rate) Ghana wants to go in terms of extraction rate and there has been 
no law stating the direction in the sense. However the ordinary Ghanaians are highly 
enthusiastic about the discovery but very skeptical due the experience with gold which has 
never affected most of the ordinary lives in Ghana.   
Interest groups: The customs and traditions of a community have a role in making the 
resource a curse or otherwise. The traditions and culture of the Ghanaian people give the 
traditional and community leaders some level of leverage over the land and the resources 
within their jurisdiction. This however does not give them an automatic constitutional right of 
ownership over those resources. This is likely to give a sense false ownership to the 
traditional and opinion (the major stakeholders) leaders in the communities where these 
resources are found. Consequently people from such communities can be motivated to make 
claims that have potential to conflict with the national interest. This apparently induced the 
traditional leaders of Western Region (where the oil and gas is found in Ghana) to make a 
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demand of 10% share of the total revenue from the oil and gas proceeds.
9
 Again since 
Ghana’s petroleum production is offshore which is most likely to affect the livelihood of the 
fishing communities along the coast. 
 Norway had a very influential and well organized fishing industry with a stronger bargaining 
power as compared to Ghana to protect the interest of its members at the time of the discovery 
in the North Sea. Caution needs to be taken here especially the concerns of the local fisher 
folks, since such concerns can lead to grievances and tensions in the production environment 
or community.  
6.2 The state, democracy, development and the petro- experience of Norway 
and the way forward for Ghana. 
Similarly to Ghana, the Norwegian state had gained political independence just a little over 
half a century when the discovery was made in the North Sea. Its political process was 
severely interrupted by the German invasion during the WWII which can be likened to the 
multiple coup d’etarts in Ghana after independence. Norway restarted in the mid 1940s with a 
social democratic system of rule. By that time Norway was recognized as an impoverished 
country which was the highest beneficiary of the Marshal Aid program in terms of per capita 
just as Ghana is an aid recipient state. It was just a little over two decades of the Norwegian 
reconstruction policy when the discovery was made. Again Ghana was also a little over two 
decades of interrupted democratic rule when the discovery was made offshore of cape three 
points in the Gulf of Guinea. In contrast to Ghana, Norway had about 150 years of industrial 
(particularly in ship building) experience before the oil discovery. And this was relevant to the 
new oil industry.   
The Norwegian State has made a significant contribution to the development of its petroleum 
industry in a strategic manner. One of the key important decisions was the establishment of a 
state owned oil company (Statoil) to help protect the Norwegian interest and exercise a strong 
national control. This was done by pairing the newly created oil company (statoil) with the 
foreign oil companies which had the technological knowhow. With this the foreign companies 
were obliged to transfer knowledge or train Statoil to acquire the technological know-how to 
be fully independent within the span of ten years based on the concession agreements. This 
apparently was easy due to the waterfall Act. This Act together with the government strategic 
                                                     
9
(Western Chiefs go wild, http://www.modernghana.com/newsthread/304789/1/133460 accessed 08/11/2012).   
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protectionism measures secured the Norwegian suppliers 45.9% all contracts awarded by 
Norwegian domestic oil companies between 1979 and 1993 McNeish & Logan et al (2012). 
This strategy succeeded in helping to fulfill the dream of high local content or participation.  
 There was the belief that the energy and the value of the Norwegian waterfalls was a free gift 
of nature and therefore it shouldn’t go to any individual instead the public or the state. This 
was the premise on which the waterfalls Act was based and determined that the state and 
hence the public owned it and all the benefits attached to it. Since Norway then did not have 
the technology to exploit it by itself it had to rely on foreign companies. But that i.e. giving 
out of concession was carefully done at the back drop of the fact that the land will be returned 
to the state after a specific period of time without compensation (i.e. Escheat). 
Another point of convergence between Ghana and Norway is the practice of democracy. The 
social democratic values of Norway have played much greater developmental role in shaping 
the oil industry and the country at large. Due to democracy, political activism was high which 
made the demand for civil rights, accountability, transparency etc easier. Examples are the 
several strikes actions by the Labor Organizations and civil societies. Also the decision to 
incorporate the labour union in the democratic regime right from the time of reconstruction 
has played a significant role in compliment of the efforts to demand accountability and the 
protection of labour rights. Though the Trade Union Congress (TUC) and the Labour 
Commission of Ghana are not as powerful as their counterparts in the political spheres of 
Norway yet, they have great influence when it comes to demand for labour rights.     
It is for a fact that the petroleum sector constitutes the largest industry of Norway. But one 
important finding is that, from a distance it is likely to believe that the Norwegian economy is 
solely dependent on its petroleum sector.  But a critical look at the structure of the Norwegian 
economy exhibits how the contribution from the petroleum sector to the development of the 
nation has a little bit been over emphasized. What I strangely find unnoticed by many scholars 
is the tax system of Norway which is relatively high and very effective. Taxes remain high as 
a proportion of GDP in Norway as compared to other countries McNeish & Logan et al (2012 
pp. 228). It seems to me that, the role of taxation in the welfare system of Norway is usually 
overshadowed by the petroleum sector. Norway unlike some of the other countries has the 
petroleum sector contributing only 21 percentage share of the GDP. This means other sectors 
of the Norwegian economy also make significant contributions. The diagrams below further 
elaborate it with more other sectors.   
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Source: Facts 2012. The Norwegian Petroleum Sector 
Figure 8 The structure of Norway’s economy 
The diagrams above show the kind contributions the petroleum sector makes to the various 
sectors of the Norwegian economy. Though the petroleum sector forms 47 percent of the total 
export of Norway, it contributes 26 percent each of total state revenue and investment. These 
show that the other sectors of the economy still perform in spite of the huge revenues accrued 
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from the petroleum boom. That is the petroleum resource did not come to strangle the other 
sector of the economy (manufacturing and agric sectors). 
In contrast the tax system in Ghana is a very good but not efficient enough to reach its 
potential, especially with respect to the informal sector. Apart from the formal sector which is 
well structured to make tax evasion extremely difficult, the informal sector which is also large 
is with conditions that make taxation a bit difficult. These difficulties lay in the predominance 
of cash transaction, lack of voluntary compliance, low standard of record keeping, high 
illiteracy rate, ignorance about the tax laws and among others (Ofori, 2009). Ghana can work 
on this sector to improve upon its revenue to reduce the possible over reliance of the economy 
on the petroleum sector.    
Again there are other several factors that have significantly contributed to the Norwegian 
achievement in making sure petroleum resources positively contribute to national 
development. Firstly, Norway made most of the activities related to oil happened on 
Norwegian soil or seas. This was meant to realize the goal of local content. Norway realized 
the need to make activities related to the petroleum industry occur in the Norwegian territories 
because that was how jobs would be created to have a multiplier effect on the economy as a 
whole.  
The petroleum industry offers jobs in diversified ways ranging from catering and cleaning 
services to engineering tasks. This is how the oil and gas industry of Norway helped in job 
creation and consequently increased the taxable population of the Norwegian economy. 
Nonetheless looking at the location of the Ekofisk field, it apparently would have been in the 
economic interest of the oil companies to carry out some activities (like rig building, refining 
etc) in the nearby countries (e.g. Britain) which already had the facilities and the expertise 
relative to the oil industry. As Philips argued that it was economically prudent to lay pipes 
directly to Europe and Britain than to send it to Norway with huge difficulty and later 
transport it back to the European market.  This was because the distance from the Ekofisk (in 
the middle of the North Sea) oil field from UK is almost the same as from the same field to 
the Norwegian land.  
Taking into account the events that occurred before the building of the state pipelines; being 
the declaration of the Norwegian Trench as almost practically impossible to build pipelines 
across (from Ekofisk) to the shores of Norway by the profit oriented oil companies. This 
indicates that, Norway was nearly denied the opportunity like jobs that come with petroleum 
76 
 
related activities on its shores, the maximum economic rent they are enjoying for owning the 
pipelines etc. If Norway had not resisted this decision of the foreign oil companies, it would 
have been losing the economic rent it is enjoying now. Since these profit oriented foreign oil 
companies are only interested in maximizing profit, they usually do not have time in investing 
in infrastructure and technology they can easily find an alternative elsewhere. For example, 
most of the rigs used at the initial stages of exploitation were imported from outside of 
Norway (particularly the USA). But since the Norwegian shipping industry was able to 
quickly adapt itself to the needs of the then new industry, the situation was quickly reversed 
by building rigs, tankers, vessels etc locally.   
Seeing Ghana through the Norwegian lens in this sense sends the signal that if Ghana is not 
cautious and quick to try and abreast itself to meet the technological requirements of the new 
oil industry, most of the required technologies and expertise are likely to be imported from the 
Americas especially Brazil. The location of Ghana’s oil find in the Atlantic Ocean (offshore) 
and the lacks of historical industrial tradition which can easily be transformed to benefit the 
oil industry as Norway did. When this is coupled with the location and the pace of 
technological advancement in Brazil (which is also along the same Atlantic Ocean) and is also 
involved in petroleum exploitation, it will be easier and apparently less expensive for the oil 
companies to take advantage of the Brazilian situation by hiring experienced workers and 
other facilities from there. Definitely Brazil now has bigger refineries and trained personnel in 
this sector than Ghana, so there is the higher incentive for the oil companies to utilize most of 
these facilities and services at the expense of the Ghanaian state. Thus technologies and 
personnel can easily be transported across the Atlantic Ocean from Brazil to Ghana. This is 
what Norway made sure to prevent. It made most of the oil related activities happened in 
Norway. In this case if Norway did not challenge Philips and later Elf and Mobil with a 
comparable counter-power, it wouldn’t have built the pipes to transport the oil and gas to 
make most of the activities happen on the shores of Norway.  
Another condition that assisted Norway was its experience in giving out concession with 
respect to hydro power. Norway passed a very radical concession laws just after independent 
from Sweden. This was about how their cheap water power was to be exploited. With this 
Norway had a long tradition of how to relate to foreign companies who wanted to exploit their 
natural resources before the great discovery in the North Sea. This was at that time seen as an 
abuse of right of those who owned lands and woods along the banks of the rivers (Ryggvik, 
2010 pp.15). And that was how radical the laws were. So prior to the arrival of the foreign oil 
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companies in the 1960s this was the modus operandi of the concession regime in Norway. 
Again these helped the state to acquire the necessary technological skills to exploit its own 
water resource. Therefore with these laws in place it was in order to conform to the already 
existing legal approach to allocation of rights to foreign companies who came to exploit the 
potential oil and gas fields in Norway. This is what gave the Norwegian government the 
impetus with ease to decree in 1963 that “The ocean floor and underground of the underwater 
areas off the coast of kingdom of Norway are under Norwegian sovereignty as regards the 
exploitation and research of natural deposits…” This was without difficulty because there 
were no private ownerships prior to that.  
All other conditions wouldn’t have been enough to have contributed to the Norwegian success 
in petroleum management without the political support the local industries enjoyed from the 
government. In order to achieve the goal of high local (Norwegian) participation, both direct 
and indirect protectionist strategies were employed. The Norwegian government used the tool 
of reprisal against the foreign companies in making sure that the shares of the Norwegian 
contractors were increased. The foreign companies who did not want to contribute to 
achieving this aim were warned to be affected in a later concession round. Again, there were 
requests that Norwegian workers should be used where possible together with the 
requirements that oil fields’ operational organizations had to be based in Norway and that all 
documents and contracts must be made in Norwegian as well as the working language on the 
platform was to be Norwegian for safety reasons (Ryggvik, 2010). Moreover, the government 
also took the initiative of training oil related expertise and creation of state research 
institutions to support Norwegian companies. These are some of advantages Norwegian 
companies had over their foreign counterparts. Also, Statoil’s dominant role as a majority 
share holder (50%) in most of the oil fields significantly assisted the authorities’ demand and 
regulations to localize the petroleum industry of Norway. Statoil’s position was used as a 
negotiation power to press home the demands of the government. For example, Mobil was 
pressed upon to give out the engineering task on Statfjord B field to a newly started 
Norwegian engineering firm (Norwegian Petroleum Consultants) as a result of Statoil’s share. 
Furthermore, the harsh Norwegian winter weather coupled with high sea waves and deep 
water find necessitated the need for Norwegian expertise in the maritime service like sailors, 
divers and engineers. All these have helped shaped the Norwegian oil experience. 
Some of the protectionary measures employed by Norway at the time of discovery will be 
difficult to be replicated by Ghana in the current era due to conditions put forth by WTO, 
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World Bank, IMF etc. Nonetheless, there is nothing wrong with an oil-producing state to do 
what it can to secure the greatest possible share of oil rent Ryggvik (2010). Therefore what 
Ghana ought to do now is not be in a haste to give out too much at the initial concession 
rounds. Also policies to put Ghana in a stronger negotiation position must be embarked upon 
in order to secure greatest possible rent.    
6.3 Conclusion 
As oil producing states there are several differences and similarities which bring to bear the 
essence of comparison between these two countries. Clarification of the differences between 
Ghana and Norway has helped contextualize the benefits of the Norwegian oil experience in 
Ghana in a systematic manner. It has been realized that oil and gas resource management 
requires strategies not only to counter the domestic interests which are contrary to the state’s 
but also the foreign interests (especially that of the profit maximizing foreign oil companies) 
in order to secure the maximum possible share of oil rent.        
In my opinion, democracy is necessary but not sufficient condition to bring to bear the 
maximum benefits from natural resources to the people. Democracy helps in the management 
of natural resource in a transparent and accountable manner but when a resource rich country 
is democratic and does not make sure to secure full control over the possible maximum share 
of economic rent it supposed to get at the expense of the foreign oil compnies, then the 
democracy will not make the significant impact it needs to make. Thus it should not be a 
democracy which only expresses itself through parliamentary representation but also through 
direct popular mobilization to demand accountability and transparency (Ryggvik 2010, p113). 
To compliment this, factors like political concept, political system are considered in paring 
the two states.  
Exploitation of natural resource especially oil and gas involves competition between the state 
and several other interests (of both domestic and foreign) groups. Both domestic and foreign 
agents’ actions in the extractive economies are directed at rent seeking activities. Therefore 
states ought to secure their national interest against the external forces whilst considering 
internal matters like transparency, accountability, democracy, strong institutions, good 
governance etc.  Because even if a state has strong institutions with democratic governance 
and losses control over its resources to its domestic and especially foreign competitor due to 
ignorance or any other reason (e.g. bad contracts) it will definitely render such institutions and 
qualities meaningless because the owners of the  resources would not fully benefit from them.    
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Chapter Seven 
7.0 Conclusions and Proposals 
This thesis is meant to look at the new oil industry of Ghana through the lens of the 
Norwegian petroleum experience to examine how beneficial that can be for Ghana. That is to 
find out the role of the state in shaping up the economy with the help of oil and gas.  The key 
findings of this research are highlighted to serve as lessons for Ghana.  
Firstly, it must be recognized that the Norwegian petroleum experience is not a product of a 
single decision or action but rather a collection of factors come together to give a better 
explanation. More often than not, transparency, accountability, democracy and 
institutionalism are mentioned as the secret of the Norwegian petroleum success. Although 
these have played important roles in the development of the Norwegian oil industry in 
positive manner, there are still other key factors without which things could have been 
different. 
Norway wouldn’t have been luckier without the radical concession law (the waterfall act) 
already in place before the discovery of the oil in 1969. It already had a way to deal with 
foreign companies who exploited their natural resources especially the hydro resource. These 
laws were bent on to protect the Norwegian interest. Therefore Norway couldn’t have done 
anything better than to conform to such laws to secure the possible greatest share of the rent. 
Subsequent concession laws were premised on that. This significantly gave Norway a strong 
negotiation power and control from the start of the development of its petroleum industry. 
This accounted for the significant reduction of foreign dominance just after few years of 
production since the concession laws accepted principle of escheat.      
Also, about 150 years of industrial tradition particularly the shipping industry contributed a 
lot in developing the local technological know-how. It was easier to transform these shipping 
companies which were then struggling to an oil related companies. Some of the current giant 
petroleum related companies used to be ship companies. A key example is Aker Solutions. 
This was the reason Norway didn’t take long time to take a full technological control over the 
oil industry. With this local participation was increased without much difficulty since some of 
the expertises in the shipping yards were of use to the new oil industry. 
The strength of the labour movements in Norway can never be underestimated. This research 
has shown that the labour movements (unions) remain as major actors in the petro-politics of 
80 
 
Norway. The level of labour militancy in Norway at the time of the oil discovery gave 
politicians and the oil companies no option than to transparent and accountable. While 
democracy and institutionalism are there to bring to fore such qualities, politicians and the 
technocrats will on be good as you demand of them. This discovery couldn’t have come at 
any other favourable time for Norway than the time the society was more determined to 
secure its power against that of the foreign oil companies. Thus active popular mobilization 
came to strengthen the social democratic values in entrenching transparency and 
accountability. 
Finally, these factors are what have complimented the efforts democracy and institutionalism 
to have made the Norwegian petroleum experience an important one. It is very important for 
Ghana to recognize these factors as not the entire story is being told about the oil industry of 
Norway especially by the oil for development program.                    
7.1 Proposals 
This section offers various lessons that Ghana as a new petroleum state should learn to avoid 
the boom and bust of its petroleum resources. Ghana is never an exception to the countries 
blessed (or cursed?) with natural resource abundance. Therefore good and practical examples 
of Norway that fit into the Ghanaian context can serve as guiding principles in the 
management of the petroleum resources of Ghana in a better manner.  
 Moderate pace of extraction. 
 Ghana ought to be patient to develop home grown solutions to the demands of the 
new petroleum industry. It must not be in a haste to extract before it gets a society 
which understands the petroleum activities in terms of technology and administration 
since the extractive activities usually come with problems like pollution, corruption, 
etc. It should take time to train local expertise in order to help indigenous industries to 
upgrade themselves to the level in which local participation can be increased. this is 
how jobs can be created by the oil industry to its fullest potential.  
 
 Flexible Regulations  
Regulations (Laws and contracts) should be improved by the state as it takes time to 
develop the new petroleum industry. The government must ensure that the legal 
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framework it operates with is sufficiently flexible for it to readjust itself anytime it 
deems it necessary.  
 Establish a state owned Oil Company.  
Apart from such practice being the normal trend in the fraternity of the oil producing 
states, it is also normal and important for an oil producing nation to have higher 
governmental control to localize  the oil activities as much as possible. And it is in the 
establishment of a state owned oil company that can create a space to develop a 
convenient oil policy to protect the Ghanaian interest against the other competitive 
forces. This is how Ghana can gain profit beside the economic rent. Also State-owned 
Oil Company becomes the option for the producing state if the foreign oil companies 
try to hold back or withdraw for any reason(s). This strengthens the negotiating power 
of the government or the state. However, in spite of government’s interest such 
company should be allowed to operate with high level of independence and little 
governmental interference.  
 Secure possible maximum economic rent  
In order to make sure Ghanaians enjoy the maximum economic rent from their 
petroleum resources, the multinational oil companies should be seriously monitored 
not to enjoy profits which are above the average profit rate. A better and effective tax 
system is the medium in which the state generates income from the use of its asset. 
The tax regime should make sure Ghana gains the maximum benefit and leave only 
average rate of profit to the oil companies. The problem of cost inflation and profit 
deflation in an attempt to reduce the taxable income must be brought to a minimal 
level. 
 Strict Environmental laws 
Petroleum is a pollutant resource therefore issues of environmental concerns should 
take a centre stage in the activities of the petroleum industry of Ghana. Authorities in 
charge of the environmental laws in Ghana should make sure to oil companies strictly 
obliged to the measures put in place to check possible pollution.   
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